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Introduction 
 
At the end of World War I in 1918, Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine had become part of the 
British Empire. “The Ottoman Empire had taken the wrong side under World War I. They 
were allied with Germany and Austria against its old enemy Russia. By the end of the war 
The Ottoman Empire was by the losers´ side.”1  
During the war, different Arab groups had fought against The Ottoman Empire, together with 
the British and French. The Arab revolution of 1916-1918, initiated by Sharif Hussein bin Ali 
from Mecca and his sons, Ali, Zayd, Abdullah and Faysal, had an impact on the balance of 
power between the British and the Ottomans during the war. The main point of the Arab 
revolution against the Ottomans was, to create an independent Arab state with Sharif Hussein 
as its leader. During the war, Great Britain made several agreements with Arab leaders 
concerning the future of some regions in the Middle-East. Those agreements would shape the 
future in the relationship of Europe with the Middle-East and among the different regions of 
the former Ottoman Empire. The post-war period brought many changes, new doctrines and 
conflicts to the new world order. The end of World War I precipitated the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire that would come years later, while at the same time, it gave impulse to the 
aspiration of independence to many regions of the former empire. It is in the light of this 
context that we intend to analyze the case of Mesopotamia. The research will try to explain 
how the post-war situation in the Middle-East affected Mesopotamia, occupied by Great 
Britain during the war.  
At the beginning of World War I, British troops had said to the people of Mesopotamia that, 
they had come to their country as liberators. But after the war, the British forces extended 
their control to the North of the country, and by 1918, they had established an administration 
for the whole Mesopotamia. At the same time that Great Britain was negotiating a deal with 
the Sharif of Mecca, another part of the British administration was making a deal with France. 
The British Sir Mark Sykes and French Charles Francois George Picot had come to an 
agreement by January 3rd 1916. In the British-French deal, the northern coast of Syria, 
Lebanon and South Anatolia would become under French control. While Bagdad and Basra, 
                                                 
1
 Hilde Henriksen Waage, Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten, kapittel 2 Midtøsten fram til først 
verdenskrig, Cappelen Damm AS 2013: 62 
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today´s central and south Iraq would be taken by Great Britain.2  It is seemed that British 
politicians were making and changing agreements along the way, in order to get what was 
best for them during and after the World War I. Another agreement that made issues 
complicated for France and Great Britain was the Balfour Declaration in November 1917.  
With the Balfour Declaration, Great Britain had declared its support for the creation of a 
Jewish national home in Palestine. The British were promising many things to many people. 
They had been dealing with the Arabs, French and Jews in order to secure their support under 
World War I.3 All these contradictory agreements would bring many problems and 
misunderstandings once the war came to an end. 
With the discovery of oil in Iran at the beginning of the 20th century, Great Britain developed 
stronger interests on the region. When the Middle-East was pulled into World War I, Great 
Britain had the need of protecting its oil interests in Iran. It was in this context that the British 
occupied the South part of Mesopotamia in November 1914, in order to secure and protect the 
Iranian oilfields close to Basra, in the South of Mesopotamia. What was in the beginning a 
British tactical occupation, became later a permanent British administration for the whole 
country since1918. The years between 1918 and 1920 were very important for the 
understanding of the situation of the Arabs in Mesopotamia, and the British politics through 
their administration of the country. Local and international events created the condition for a 
revolt in Mesopotamia during the summer of 1920. 
The Iraqi revolution of 1920 forced the British to change the methods of their administration 
in Iraq.  Shi`i and Sunni Arabs fought together against a common enemy represented by the 
British occupation. Military, Great Britain was able to suppress the revolt after losing 
hundreds of soldiers. Economically, the revolt became very expensive for the new mandate, 
something that made Great Britain reshape its colonial administration. Politically, the 
revolution gave the Arabs living in Iraq, more access to the public administration and set the 
roots for later independence. After the rebellion, the British government decided to create an 
Iraqi monarchy in 1921, installing Faysal I, son of the Sharif of Mecca, as King of Iraq.  
The historical context of this thesis is from the beginning of World War I, in 1914 until 1921. 
But the main period that had been analyzed is, the last three years of the British Civil 
Administration of Mesopotamia, between 1918 and 1921. 
                                                 
2
 Henriksen Waage 2013: 66 
3
 Henriksen Waage 2013: 66 
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Subject of Research 
In order to understand the causes of the Iraqi revolution of 1920, it is necessary to take a look 
at the situation in which Iraq was under British control. By studying and interpreting official 
documents from the British administration at that time, this thesis offers insight into Britain´s 
administration in Iraq before the revolt. Before reaching a satisfactory explanation of the 
situation before and after revolution, this study had investigated how the relationship between 
the British and the Arabs were since the end of World War I. Through the use of primary and 
secondary sources, the thesis studies the Arab key players during the revolution and the 
impact the revolt had in Iraq´s road to independence.  
The fundamental questions that this study seeks to answer are:  
Who were the people of Mesopotamia at the time of the British occupation? 
What kind of administration and changes did the British implement in the country?  
What caused the Iraq revolution of 1920?  
Did the revolution bring any change to Mesopotamia?   
These are the central questions to be answered in this thesis, focusing between the years of 
1918 and 1921. There seems to be a connection between the British methods of controlling 
Mesopotamia and some of the reasons for the Iraqi revolt. The purpose of this thesis is, to 
take a closer look at the British administration of Mesopotamia during the last two years 
before the rebellion that challenged the British control of that country.  
 
Current Theories 
The majority of the consulted sources for this investigation explain in a brief way some of the 
previous questions, but almost none of them treat the social, political and cultural causes of 
the revolt in relationship to the British Administration. None of the books and studies 
investigated for this thesis had focused mainly on the British administration of Mesopotamia 
between 1918, when it was expanded from Basra to the whole country, and 1920 when the 
rebellion started. 
13 
 
The falling Ottoman Empire brought changes in the way tribes and leaders related to each 
other. British politicians applied the tactic of divide and conquer during their new 
administration in Mesopotamia. Many Arab Sheiks gained more power under the British 
mandate than what they used to have under the former Ottoman rule. In this way those Sheiks 
were more in obligation to the British than to their tribes. Divisions between some Sheiks and 
tribes, together with the promises made by the British army and politicians to some of the 
Arab leaders during war time, created a nationalist movement hoping to have more influence 
in the future Mesopotamia after the war. Thus, the British approach in dealing with different 
Arab leaders in Mesopotamia and Syria, together with the international context after World 
War I, brought unexpected events in the region, especial during 1920.  
“In Karbala a leading Shi´i cleric, Ayatollah Muhammas Taqi al-Shirazi, issued a legal 
opinion (fatwa) declaring that “one who is a Muslim has no right to elect and choose a non-
Muslim to rule over the Muslims and said service in the British administration was 
unlawful.”4  Another group felt better under British rule: “Merchants and other prominent 
secular notables, however, wrote declarations of support for continued British rule.” 5  
All these contradicted opinions were reflected in a survey/plebiscite ordered by the British 
Civil administrator, Sir Arnold T. Wilson in 1919 as a way of confirming what kind of 
government the Iraqi people wanted. The result created a division among the British, between 
those like Wilson who was in favor of continuing British control over Iraq, and those in the 
Foreign Office, “like Gertrude Bell, [who] concluded that Arab nationalism was developing 
an unstoppable momentum.”6  Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arnold T. Wilson had become the 
acting civil commissioner of Iraq. “He was a member of the Indian Political Service, was a 
staff officer to the General Officer Commanding (GOC), but he reported not to the War 
Office [England], but to the Government of India.”7 This information gives an insight into the 
contradictions among British in Great Britain and India concerning how they applied their 
administrative policies in Iraq. 
The revolution was, in part, the result of divisions between Arabs (Sheiks and tribes), Shi`i 
and Sunni Muslims, British in Iraq and those in the government in England. Through the 
                                                 
4
 Reeva Spector Simon, Eleanor H. Tejrian, The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921  Chapter 1, The View from Basra: Southern 
Iraq´s Reaction to WarOccupation, 1915-1925 Columbia University Press, New York 2004: 27 
5
 Reeva Spector Simon, Eleanor H. Tejrian 2004: 27 
6
 Reeva Spector Simon, Eleanor H. Tejrian 2004: 27 
7
 Mark Jacobsen 1991: 324 
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following chapters this thesis will focus on the religious, social and economical differences 
among the Iraqi Arabs prior to the revolution. An analysis of the British foreign policy, both 
from Great Britain and their differences with the officials in charge of the administration in 
Iraq, is necessary in order to get a better picture of the situation at that time.  
“From the end of 1918 to October 1920, British policy on Iraq went through a confused 
period, and this was a major cause of the crisis of 1920.”8 The London office did not take any 
important decision concerning the future of Iraq, until April 1920 at the San Remo conference 
where it was decided that Iraq would become a British Mandate. In 1917, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, 
Secretary of the British Political Department had suggested a semi-autonomous Arab regime 
for Iraq, in order to give more political influence to Iraqi Arabs. This was a suggestion that 
commissioner Arnold T. Wilson was not willing to accept, and the events that took place 
during 1920, proved that Wilson was wrong. 
This thesis will take a closer look at the British administration between 1918 and 1920, 
because there were many contradictions among the different British offices concerning the 
foreign policy of Iraq. At the same time, it is important to analyze why such a revolution took 
the British by surprise when they were aware of a growing nationalist feeling among many 
Arabs in Iraq. 
After months of fighting, the British army was able to suffocate the revolt, but they realized 
that the politics and administration had to be reorganized by giving more participation to Iraqi 
Arabs. The instability of Iraq made the British administration to implement changes, and that 
was when they decided to create a monarchy with Faisal I as a king. 
It was perhaps the main achievement of the British in Iraq that they were able to create at least the 
resemblance of an independent monarchical state while retaining their essential interests. The solution 
had been planned by A. T. Wilson as early as 30 July 1920 when, hearing that Faysal had been deposed 
in Syria, he wired the India Office suggesting that Faysal should be offered “the ledership of the 
Mesopotamian State.”9  
With the economic cost of this revolution, British officials realized it was a time for changes 
in the way Iraq was administrated. “At its most fundamental, the Arab revolt taught Iraq could 
                                                 
8
 D.K. Fieldhouse Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958 Oxford University press 2006: 84 
9
 D. K. Fieldhouse 2006: 88 
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not be held as a dependent state. For financial as well as strategic reasons, there was no 
alternative to the mandate and to hoping that rule by “moderates” would succeed.”10 
Some of the literature consulted for this thesis, focuses on the British occupation of 
Mesopotamia at the beginning of World War I, while other´s main analysis had been the 
details of the Iraqi revolution. But as far as the investigation for this thesis had come, there 
were not works written about the British administration of the Mesopotamia during the years 
before the revolution. That is the perspective this master thesis intends to bring to the 
historical debate of the Iraqi revolt of 1920. 
 
Sources 
This thesis had been based on primary and secondary sources.  I had visited the British 
National Archives in order to find primary sources from the time of the British Administration 
of Mesopotamia, especially between the years of 1918 and 1920. Among the secondary 
sources that had been consulted are books like: Kadhim, Abbas. “-Reclaiming Iraq: The 1920 
Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State-” In his book, professor Abbas Kadhim 
analyses the Iraqi revolution of 1920, based on Iraqi written sources, as a way of bringing 
another perspective in the interpretation of the events. Among the literature consulted for this 
thesis, there are different writers who had brought important interpretations to the British and 
French history in the Middle-East during and after World War I. The list of books so far 
consulted during the investigation for this thesis, is written with detail in the last pages of this 
work. But among the book consulted are: Fieldhouse, D. K. “Western Imperialism in the 
Middle East 1914-1958.”; Lieb, Peter, “Suppressing insurgencies in comparison: the 
Germans in the Ukraine, 1918, and the British in Mesopotamia, 1920, Small Wars and 
Insurgence” vol. 23, Nos. 4-5. October-December 2012;  Waage, Henriksen Hilde, Konflikt 
og Sotrmaktspolitikk I Midtøsten; Spector, Simon Reeva – Tejirian, H. Eleanor, “The Creation 
of Iraq 1914-1921”; Tripp, Charles, “A History of Iraq,” Rogan, Eugene, “Araberne, 
Historien om det arabiske folk.” 
This investigation intends to bring another perspective concerning some of the reasons for the 
Iraqi revolution of 1920. By analyzing the local and international context of the time, in 
connection with the revolt, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the event. The 
                                                 
10
 Mark Jacobsen  1991: 358 
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British documents consulted for this investigation, especially those concerning the British 
Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, had given an insight of Great Britain´s decisions, 
politics and plans for the Middle-East, during and after World War I. Through this thesis the 
British Administration of Mesopotamia is the central point, in relationship to some of the 
main reasons for the Iraqi revolution. 
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Chapter 1 
Mesopotamia during the Late 19th Century 
 
The Arrival of the British troops to Mesopotamia at the beginning of World War I, found a 
country going through a social, political and economic change. Those changes were the result 
of reforms that had been implemented by the Ottomans decades before. In order to understand 
the situation of Mesopotamia, before, and at the moment that Great Britain decided to occupy 
the country, this chapter is analyzing who were the people of Mesopotamia and the condition 
of the country at the moment of the British occupation. 
The decline of the Ottoman Empire was a long process that lasted several centuries. Internal 
as well as international events contributed to its fall.  “With the loss of Hungary in 1699 the 
Ottoman Empire had entered a on a long process of territorial disintegration”11.  After the 
1850s, the Ottoman dynasty experienced a relatively rapid downfall.  Inside the Ottoman 
Empire were different groups of people with different religions and culture. Although the 
majority of the people in the Ottoman Empire were Muslim, there were also Jews and 
Christians among them. Due to the vast extension of the empire, there were places, like Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq, where the Ottomans did not have the same amount of power and influence as 
in other central places. In the population of the empire, there were division among Turks and 
Arabs, Sunni, Shi´i, Druze and Wahhabi Muslims. The growing European nationalism and 
imperialism played a central role in the events that took place during the last sixty years of the 
Empire. It was after 1850 that great social, political and economic changes were experienced 
by the decadent Empire and its relation to the European continent. 
What characterized the last period of the Ottoman Empire between 1850 and 1914 and how 
did it affect Mesopotamia?    
The Crimean War of 1854-1856 (British, French and Ottoman against Russians) marked the 
beginning of a more direct influence of Great Britain and France in the Middle East. The 
Ottomans were on the winning side while Russia ended up losing the war. The war exposed 
the weakness and lack of organization of the Ottoman leaders. Due to the results of the war 
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 Palmer-Colton-Kramer, A History of the Modern World since 1815 (McGraw-Hill International Edition, New 
York) 2007: 644 
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and the display of power showed by France and Great Britain, the Ottomans saw the need for 
reforms and organization. They started implementing reforms, based on the European state 
model.12   
What kind of reform did the Ottomans implement, and how did it affect Mesopotamia?  
Mesopotamia, as it was first known by the West and in later time as Iraq, became part of the 
Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth century. The long contact between the 
Ottoman Empire and Europe helped to develop a trading link that resulted in a more profit 
oriented economy among Ottomans and some of the countries under its domain. 
Mesopotamia, due to its distance from the center of the Empire, was never under complete 
Ottoman dominance. “First, although formally a part of the empire, this area [Iraq] had for 
centuries been outside direct Ottoman control and the Ottoman reassertion of power in the 
area was a nineteenth century phenomenon.”13 The Ottoman reassertion of power in 
Mesopotamia was a direct consequence of the internal changes they intended to apply in order 
to restructure and modernize their administration. These new reforms would prove 
challenging, because of the nature and structure of the social and political organization of the 
people of Mesopotamia. This part of the empire was populated by semi-autonomous tribes, 
tribal confederations and influential Sheikhs. The new Ottoman reforms had a direct impact in 
the relations of the different groups in Mesopotamia. Some of the consequences of the 
reforms were that they had the effect of creating new interests and groups.14 These new 
groups would mark a new era in the interaction of the empire and its people in Mesopotamia. 
 
New Laws  
The Land Law of 1858 and the Vilayet Law of 1864 were the two main instruments used by 
the Ottomans as a way of transforming the administration of Mesopotamia. The Land Law 
intended to regulate the land tenure. It was meant to organize the state ownership of the land. 
This law had a great impact in the social organization of Mesopotamia, because from that 
moment the tribes started moving from having a relative autonomy of the land to becoming 
tenants and sharecroppers. The intention of the Ottomans with that law was to improve 
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 Palmer-Colton-Kramer, 2007: 645 
13
 Reidar Visser, British policy and inter-sectarian relations in Iraq, 1914-1926, A preliminary study based on 
documents of the British government, No. 222 September 1997: 4 
14
 Charles Trip, A History of Iraq, (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom) 2000: 14 
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productivity, agriculture and investment. The negative aspect of the Land Law was that it 
gave all the power of the land to the Sheikhs in the countryside. In a society moving from a 
pastoralist way of life to agriculture as the main economic system, the ownership of the land 
meant to have more economical and political power.  The reforms gave opportunity to new 
individuals for participation in the state and in the new social order that was taking place at 
the time.15 
The Vilayet Law of 1864 intended to reorganize the administration of the empire. It would 
define the functions of the provincial officials, governors and people working in the 
administrative branch.  The main problem was that the majority of people working in the 
public administration were Sunni Muslim, which was a minority of the population.  Mosul, 
Baghdad and Basra, the three main provinces of Mesopotamia, later known as Iraq, were 
geographically divided by that new Law. “The Vilayet Law mapped out the territorial 
boundaries of the three provinces and established a new structure of administration down to 
the village level, intending to bring central administration systematically down to people.”16 
These European inspired reforms would bring changes that were far from intended by the 
Ottomans.  
The Land law focused on individual ownership of the land. But the culture and custom among 
the majority of tribes was collective ownership of the land, something that the new law 
prohibited.  Consequently, the tribes placed their land ownership on the Sheikh, the most 
respected member of a tribe.17  From that moment on, the tribes that previously had owned 
land collectively, slowly became tenant farmers. Another group that benefited from the new 
land law was the urban elite. This group was composed of city merchants and state employees 
having enough means to get more economical and political power through owning land and 
those who would work on it. These land and administrative reforms were the basic ingredients 
for the new confrontations to come in Mesopotamia.  
The social composition was changing with the emergence of powerful families in the cities 
and Sheikhs owning most of the registered land in the country side. This change became an 
unbreakable wall to be confronted by the Ottomans. The Ottomans had to give space to many 
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prominent people coming from rich and influential families in the public administration.  
According to Samira Haj, Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at New York University:  
As a result, the Ottoman Rulers, including Midhat Pasha (Ottoman governor in Mesopotamia 
1869-1872) found themselves with no other choice but to ally with, and currently incorporate the 
leading members of dominant houses into the new state bureaucracy.18  
The pyramid, upon which the society in Mesopotamia was based on, was reshaped by the new 
system. Before the 1850s the old social composition was based on a highly pastoralist 
economy. The new focus of the Ottoman administration was on agriculture and therefore the 
emphasis on land redistribution. An asymmetric relation of dependence between the landlord 
and the cultivator developed within short time. Landlords, following the Ottoman direction, 
decided what and how to cultivate the land. At the same time, the cultivator without land did 
not receive wages as payment but a share of the crops. A struggle for power was taking place 
among the different social classes created by the new reforms in Mesopotamia in the last 
years of the Ottoman Empire.19 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, after World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, the traditional social and economic Ottoman system would be challenged20 
 
The Ottoman Provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra 
The rivers Tigris and Euphrates were the heart of this land at the time, “[t]he term al-`Iraq 
meaning the shore of the great river along its length, as well as the grazing land surrounding 
it”21  . Ottoman rulers divided this area in three Vilayets (provinces): Mosul in the North, 
Baghdad in the center and Basra in the South. Since the beginning of the Ottoman rule over 
this area, the relationship between conqueror and conquered was mostly a difficult one. In 
most of the sources so far consulted it is often stressed the constant opposition of the Iraqi 
people to the Ottomans rule. The Mountains of the North served as great wall for the Kurdish 
people.  The Shi´i tribes of the center used the valleys and desert to their favorable advantage 
when fighting the Ottomans. It was after late 1850s that the central government of the empire 
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 Samira Haj, The Making of Iraq 1900-1963, Capital, Power and Ideology, State University of New York Press 
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decided to extend its control through the three provinces. In practice it became a challenge, 
because in order to rule Mesopotamia, the Ottomans had to use new laws, give power access 
to prominent families and sheikhs, and use military force.22 “Until the time of Midhat Pasha, 
the capable and enlightened Governor of Baghdad between1869-1871, Mosul, Baghdad and 
Basra were only under nominal and occasional control of the authorities.”23 
 
Mosul 
Placed in the North of Iraq, Mosul was geographical and politically closer to the heart of the 
Ottoman Empire. The majority of the population here were Sunni, but there were Kurds, 
Christian and Jews as well. Strong Kurdish nationalism grew in this region during the last 
years of the empire and even more after 1914. The Kurds consisted largely of sedentary and 
nomadic tribes dedicated to pastoralism and agriculture, but there were others engaged in 
commercial activities, like the transit trade. Transit trade was the commercial activity created 
by the passage of goods through the region. The tribe was at the center of the social 
composition of the region and played an important role in its relationship with the empire. 
“These [tribes]determined the relationship of individuals to the land and shaped the 
hierarchies of clans and families in the various settlements.”24 
 
Baghdad 
Because of its central position in the Iraqi landscape, Baghdad was the provincial capital. In 
this province the Georgian Mamluks “[slaves taken as boys from Christian families in Georgia 
and converted to Islam for military purpose]” formed a military caste at the top of the social 
composition.25 The daily activities of most of the population were as in Monsul, sedentary and 
semi-sedentary tribes. The Ottomans only partially imposed their rule in the regions close to 
the center of Baghdad. In the case of Baghdad, the Ottomans could not control the whole 
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region. In this province a large part of the population was Shi´i Muslim, although Jews made 
up close to 20 per cent of its inhabitants. Najaf, Karbala, al-Kazimiyya and Samarra were 
sacred towns in Baghdad, “long associated with the history of Caliph Ali bin Abi Talib and 
his descendants.26 Through these towns there was a constant pilgrimage of Persians coming to 
the Muslims religious centers. The Shi´i in Baghdad never accepted the Ottoman rule. In this 
regard most of the tribes did not like the idea of paying taxes to an Ottoman authority they did 
not recognize as theirs. Shi´i Islam experienced a considerable growth in the last two 
centuries of the empire among the population of Baghdad, especially because of their position 
against the Ottoman rule. The Mamluk Pashas (governors) of Baghdad were Sunni Muslims, 
and that was one of the many reasons for the deep and serious religious conflicts between 
Sunni and Shi´i Muslims in the area. 
 
Basra 
Located in the South of Iraq, Basra was an important link to the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. 
The Vilayet of Basra had been in and out of the Ottoman influence since the sixteenth 
century. “It was not until the 1870s that the al-Hasa area south Basra again became an area of 
actual Ottoman presence after a successful military expedition.”27 This province was 
governed by the Mamluk military caste as in Baghdad. Basra underwent several periods of 
direct rule from Baghdad, until 1884 when it came under the direct rule of Istanbul. Basra 
became an important trade center for the Ottomans and the British as well. The majority of 
the population was descendant from sedentary tribes, although others in the countryside were 
semi-nomadic and most of them were Arabic-speaking. A population statistic from 1919 
“suggests that 78,8% were Shi´i, 14,7% Sunnis, 4,2% Jews, 1,3% Christians and 0,9% 
Sabeans.”28 The population of Basra had a considerable Shi´i majority, while the elite families 
were Sunni Muslim. These Sunni families enjoyed of higher status and power, something that 
in time would bring religious and interest conflicts, with the reforms implemented by the 
Ottomans after 1858. 
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Consequences 
Since the nineteenth century Great Britain had a connection with Mesopotamia and the Gulf, 
due to British interests in the route to India and the trade that it had developed in the Indian 
Ocean. Between 1820 and 1899 Great Britain concluded several treaties with tribal chiefs 
from Bahrain and the Arab Emirates. Some of those treaties were designed by the British, 
where they demanded the tribal chiefs not to grant any territory except to Great Britain. Those 
treaties seemed to be designed in order to counter the growing French interests in the region.29 
With the expansion of the European influence in the Middle East and Asia, Mesopotamia 
became an important source for trade for Great Britain and France. At the same time the 
Ottoman rulers by 1850s had decided to modernize their administration in order to increase 
their revenues. The implementation of new laws by the Ottomans was a mean to gain more 
control and reorganize Mesopotamia according to their interests. These reforms had a deep 
socio-political and economical impact among the population. The land was supposed to 
belong to individuals and not the tribe under the new legislation. Prominent Sunni families 
and Shi´i Sheikhs became landlords, while members of most of the tribes who were the 
majority of the population, in a very dramatic process suddenly were in the position of tenants 
and cultivators without rights over their previous land. Mesopotamia was a region where the 
Ottomans could hardly place under their central control. The total centralization of power 
over the provinces of the empire was not totally complete. Many tribes had substantial 
degrees of autonomy until the collapse of the empire. That seemed to be reason why the 
Ottoman shared the power with some of the elites in many regions of the empire.30 
The new Land Laws and administrative system created new power groups that competed for 
influence in the public administration and for the owning of land. Sunni Muslim elites of the 
cities gained more power due to their privileged position in society and access to public 
administration and means to acquire land. Shi´i Muslim Sheikhs became an influential group 
after owning most of the land in the country side with the land reform. A population 
composed of tribes that previously shared the ownership of the land, became simple tenants. 
A conflict of interests was taking place as a direct consequence of these changes. 
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The reforms that were intended to make the economy and administration more efficient, 
created two powerful groups, one in the cities and the other on the country side that would 
later compete for the political power in Mesopotamia at the time when the Ottoman Empire 
was falling. 
During the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the British influence in 
Mesopotamia consisted basically in commerce. But by the late 19th century, Russia and 
Germany were becoming contenders in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf and 
Mesopotamia. The control of the commercial routes was essential for Great Britain. With the 
discovery of oil in Iran and the outbreak of the World War I, the British decided to take 
control of the South of Mesopotamia, in order to secure their interests. The social, political 
and economic situation of Mesopotamia at the time of the British arrival became a challenge 
when Great Britain decided to organize a British Civil Administration in the country.31 
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Chapter 2 
The British Rule in Mesopotamia 1914-1920 and the 
Revolution Roots 
 
The establishment of a British administration in Mesopotamia in 1918 had its roots in the 
beginning of World War I. What was a tactical occupation of the south of the country, to 
secure the oil fields of Persia during the World War I, became a total occupation years later, 
until it was turned into a British mandate in 1920. Why what was supposed to be a tactical 
and temporary occupation of Basra, in the south of the country, extended towards the north 
until British controlled the whole of Mesopotamia in 1918? What did British do once they 
defeated the Ottoman Empire and controlled Mesopotamia? What was the international 
context in the rest of the Middle East and US role in it?  
 
The First World War Reaching the Ottoman Empire 
On October 31st, 1914, the Ottoman Empire declared war against Great Britain and the Allies, 
after joining Germany and Austria. The decision of going to war on the side of Germany 
would have a great repercussion for the Ottomans, and was going to reshape the politic 
landscape of the whole area, creating a series of Mandates that later became the states 
conforming  today´s Middle East.  
Since the 19th century Great Britain had been in close contact with Mesopotamia and the 
Arabian Peninsula. Because of Britain´s strong interests in India, the British had the need of 
protecting the route through the Indian Ocean. During that time British ships had been under 
pirate attacks from the Gulf coast, and therefore “British concluded a treaty of maritime peace 
with the tribal chiefs of Bahrain and the areas now roughly corresponding to the United Arab 
Emirates in 1820.”32 Through the rest of the 19th century, Western´s ideas and technological 
development had been influencing the Ottoman Empire and Mesopotamia and brought 
important changes in almost every aspect of the society. “These changes were stimulated by 
the printing press, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the steam engine, the postal service, 
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and the telegraph.”33 All these ideas and technology would influence many of the most 
important intellectuals of Mesopotamia and would play an important role in the later events.  
Like Great Britain, other European countries had developed certain interests in some of the 
vast area of the Ottoman Empire. During the 19th century France became attracted by the idea 
of having influence in the weak Ottoman Empire. However, Great Britain after having been in 
contact with some of the most important chiefs of the Arab Peninsula, forced an agreement 
with those chiefs in 1892 “largely to counter what seemed to be growing French interests. 
Bahrain and the lower Gulf emirate were obliged to sign further agreements with Britain 
under which they agreed not to grant or dispose of any part of their territories except to 
Britain.”34  
By the turn of the 20th century, British strongest rival concerning some of the areas of the 
Ottoman Empire was Germany. After its unification in 1870, Germany started an expansive 
foreign policy. “In the Iraqi part of this policy, it pressed for a railway concession in 1899 – 
“Berlin to Baghdad” line- and began a steamship service to the Gulf in 1906.”35  The railway 
concession given to Germany by the Ottomans would later be headache for the British, when 
they suspected of the potentially rich old deposit in northern Mesopotamia.  Within its power, 
Great Britain was trying to isolate the Arab Peninsula, Iran and Mesopotamia from any other 
European power´s influence. This tactic would be reflected during and after War World I. 
 
The Oil Discovery 
William Knox D´Arcy was an English millionaire and an entrepreneur, he came to Iran in 
1901 and “acquired a concession from Muzaffar ed-Din Shah (king of Persia 1896-1907) to 
search for oil in return for a down payment of £20,000, a further £20,000 in shares and 16 per 
cent the net profits of any company formed to work the concessions.”36 From that moment on, 
Muzaffar ed-Din Shah of Iran started granting concession to others European countries 
interested in oil, and this in turn created the conditions for Great Britain, France and Russia to 
have more influence on the area.i 
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The importance of oil is a vital aspect that has to be taken in consideration in order to 
understand the situation of Great Britain and its relationship with the Ottoman Empire before 
World War I. Since 1904 the British started seeing the possibility of converting the Royal 
Navy´s warship from coal to oil, and that technological development would play a decisive 
role for the next years.  By 1908 the British government was in charge of the oil explorations 
in Iran. 
In 1909 another British oil company was created, it was the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This 
was the company that would exploit and administrate the Persian oil from then on. 
Between 1908 and 1914 an increasing interests on the Iranian oilfields among different oil 
companies was at its peak. The Royal Dutch/Shell Company, which originally was a Dutch 
concern, had come into the oil competition. By the end of 1912 “the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company was fast running out of capital.”37 This was creating a problem for the British due 
to the huge capital owned by their rival the Royal Dutch/Shell Company. The increasing 
interests for developing modern Navy based on fuel oil instead of coal, was pressing the 
British government into a more direct involvement in the oil exploitation. 
The need to solve these two problems “prompted the British government to acquire a majority 
shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1914.”38The main aspect of that strategy 
was that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was going to be partially nationalized, with the 
British government owning the 51 per cent of the shares and the authority to appoint the 
directors.  
Between 1899 and 1905 Germany had been granted the concession for building the Berlin-
Baghdad railway. With the “oil fever”, Germany started searching for oil in the north of 
Mesopotamia and German engineers “had subsequently passed this information to 
representatives of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin.”39 After that, the race for the oil supremacy in 
Iran and the North of Mesopotamia was already on, between the Dutch and British 
companies. In 1912 the Deutsche Bank tried to reach an agreement with the Ottoman 
authorities in order to start drilling operations around the area Mosul in the North of 
Mesopotamia. Another event started complicating things for the British. “The British 
ambassador in Istanbul reported that the Turks themselves had plans to set up an oil company 
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to work the oil not only around Mosul but also in the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra.”40 By 
1912 another company was created, it was the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), which 
was Turkish just in name, because the owners were the Royal Dutch/Shell, the Deutsche Bank 
and the Turkish National Bank, a 50 per cent British owned bank.ii 
In the beginning of 1914 Great Britain was able to restructure the Turkish Petroleum 
Company where they had more than 50 per cent shares, and left the Deutsche Bank with just 
20 per cent of the TPC shares. Just five months before World War I, Great Britain was 
practically alone ruling the oil of Iran and securing some important areas of what later would 
become great oil deposits in Mesopotamia.iii 
 
The Ottoman Empire Allied with Germany 
The economical penetration of Europe into the Ottoman Empire since the 19th century, 
internal rebellion and debt, had weakened the empire to its limits by the beginning of the 20th 
century. Europe had been lending money to the Ottomans, but due to multiple reasons like, 
lack of knowledge concerning Capitalism, corruption and internal turmoil, the Ottomans had 
failed to repay the huge loans taken from Europe. By the turn of the 20th century, Europe was 
in control of most of the tax collecting system of the empire. Great Britain was a very 
important member of this European Administration collecting the Ottoman taxes.  
Great Britain had been building two battleships for Turkey, and by 1914 one of them, The 
Sultan Osman, was already finished, but due to lacking of space at the dock in Istanbul, the 
British had not delivered it yet. Then “on 28 July, the day on which Austria declared war on 
Serbia, Churchill proposed that both ships should be requisitioned for the Royal Army and on 
31 July, the cabinet approved their seizure.”41 
The seizure of the battleships implemented by Great Britain provoked a quick response by the 
Ottoman ruler Enver Pasha, and on August 2nd the Ottoman Empire signed an alliance with 
Germany. On August 3rd, Germany declared war on Russia, who was allied with France. 
Great Britain declared war to Germany the day after. But it was not until October 31st, that the 
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Ottoman Empire entered the war on the side of Germany and Austria against Great Britain 
and the Allies.42 
With a war coming, Great Britain was facing a problem. British oilfields in south-west Persia 
were very close to their enemies the Ottoman Empire, namely in Mesopotamia. The next step 
would be to take control over Mesopotamia. 
 
Great Britain Taking Control of Mesopotamia 1914-1918 
On November 6th 1914, the British-Indian forces landed in the South part of Mesopotamia, at 
Fao port. With the forces came Sir Percy Cox, Chief Political Officer and Arnold T. Wilson, 
political officer of the Indian Army under the command of Sir Percy Cox. Sir Percy Cox and 
Arnold T. Wilson came to Mesopotamia from India, where they had been working as British 
officials. The experience and concepts applied by British officers in India would be the main 
reference British in Mesopotamia would put into practice.  These two officials would play a 
very important role in the aftermath of the British occupation of Mesopotamia, especially 
between 1918 and 1921. 
The main purpose of the British occupation of Mesopotamia was stated: “British Maritime 
and commercial interests in the Persian Gulf, together with its political importance to the 
government of India, had thrust upon us responsibilities which we could not avoid.”43 From 
November 1914 Great Britain´s occupation of Mesopotamia was mainly to protect their 
financial interests linked to the oilfields in Iran. The first vilayet to be taken was Basra in the 
South of modern Iraq on November 22nd. The relatively easy advance and control of that 
vilayet triggered possibilities of continuing the march towards Baghdad.  
It was from the very beginning of the British military forces took control of Basra that 
practical differences between the Indian Office in London and the Officials in Mesopotamia 
started to appear. “The India Office in London wanted a holding operation at the head of the 
Gulf, the kind of exercise for which minds in the Military Department of the Government of 
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India were well suited.”44 On the one hand, just five days after the capture of Basra, a Civil 
Administration started taking form in order to reorganize the vilayet. At the head of it was Sir 
Percy Cox. On the other hand, the officials on the ground on Mesopotamia were thinking in 
another way, different than the Indian Office in London, while British forces continued 
advancing towards the north. After taking Basra without any strong defense from the 
Ottomans, “the temptation to advance proved irresistible and it was not checked by any 
serious hesitation from behind the scenes.”45 
The officer in charge of the forces on the way to Baghdad was Major General Charles 
Townshend. He was going to witness a devastating British setback in Mesopotamia since the 
arrival of the forces in November 6th, 1914. Kut-al-Amara, in the north, between Basra and 
Baghdad, was the place where British forces confronted the first real Ottoman backfire. From 
December 1915 until the spring of 1916, British forces marching on the way to Baghdad had 
been sent on retreat to Kut. Not only the British soldiers had to retreat, but they were kept in a 
siege that took almost five months to break, where British lost many soldiers. The Ottoman 
forces were superior in number, but, “the Ottoman numerical advantage was not decisive. The 
Enemy was much stronger than Townshend expected.”46  
The British military advance captured Baghdad on March 1917, and took control of Mosul, 
the third vilayet in the North of Mesopotamia after the Armistice of Mudros on October 30th, 
1918. The Armistice of Mudros was the Ottoman Empire surrender to the British and the 
Allies in World War I. With the Ottoman surrender, the military conquer of Mesopotamia was 
a fact, and it was from 1918 that a general British Administration for the whole Mesopotamia 
started taking shape. “Conquering Iraq would take almost four years and cost another 20, 000 
British (mainly Indian) casualties.”47 
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The British Administration of Mesopotamia 1918-1920 
After the Armistice of 1918, British officers started the organization of Mesopotamia under a 
civil administration for the whole area.  
On March 1917, Lt. General Sir Stanley Maude the commanding officer in charge of the 
British forces taking control of Baghdad addressed to the people of the vilayet. The speech is 
crucial in order to understand the later dramatic events that took place just two years later in 
Mesopotamia: 
It is the hope of the British Government that the aspiration of your philosophers and writers 
shall be realized once again. The People of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their wealth and 
substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws and their racial 
ideal. O, people of Baghdad! Remember that for 26 generations you have suffered under 
strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to set one Arab house against another in order that 
they might profit by your dissensions. Therefore, I am commanded to invite you, through your 
nobles and elders and representatives, to participate in the management of your civil affairs, in 
collaboration with the political representatives of Great Britain who accompany the British 
Army, so that you may unite your kinsmen in the north, east, south and west in realizing the 
aspiration of your race.48 
These were the words of the British officers as they were taking control of Baghdad in 1917, 
and planning the civil administration for the entire country.  What the British promised to the 
people of Baghdad on that speech, would be very distant from the reality that would come 
later. Mesopotamia had been very difficult to control by the Ottoman Empire through the 
course of several centuries, and it did not turn out to be easily controlled by the British either. 
What kind of impression did British officers have of the people in Mesopotamia?  
 
British Impression of the People from Mesopotamia 
The view British officers had of the people in Mesopotamia at the time of their arrival was 
based on what British knew and imagined about the Ottoman Empire. How the British 
perceived the legacy of the Ottoman Empire profoundly shaped their interaction with Iraqi 
society and their reform of its governmental structures.49 For the British officers organizing 
the administration of Mesopotamia, the Ottomans were corrupt and inefficient in terms of 
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ruling that country. In the British reports, they described a very dramatic picture of what they 
found at the very beginning of their settlement in 1914 at the vilayet of Basra in the south: 
“To this end it was decided to keep intact the Turkish system, to which the people were 
accustomed, but to free it from corruption and abuses and increase its efficiency.”50 But at the 
same time, British officers mention several times that there were not records of the Ottoman 
administration: “Not only were there no registers left, but the land records had been taken 
away.”51 In their own words, the new British administration was going to transform and the 
management of the country.  How could the British have such a clear view of what the 
Ottoman Empire´s former administration was, when British themselves wrote in their reports 
that they did not have any documents concerning the Ottoman´s administration?  “The initial 
difficulties in setting up civil administration in the occupied territories were greatly enhanced 
by the fact that, except for a few Arab subordinates, all former Turkish officials had fled, 
taking with them the most recent documents and registers.”52 This view of the Ottoman 
Empire was going to permeate every kind of relationship and decision of the future 
administration.  British forces had little knowledge about who were the people living in 
Mesopotamia. Most of the perception the British and Europeans had about the Ottoman 
Empire was based on the Oriental view of the people living on the Middle East dating back to 
the 18th century. ”The Ottoman Empire in Iraq was conceived as an Oriental Despotism. 
Under this rubric it was unchanging and unable to escape the constraints of its inherent 
superstition, violence and corruption.”53  
Another aspect of the British view of Mesopotamia was, how they saw and categorized the 
population according to their European imagination of what this people was. British officers 
divided the population in three categories. They were: the Bedouin and Kurds, the peasants 
and Sheikhs, and the third group were the town people, the bureaucrats, also known as 
effendis. 
British divided the three former categories into two groups. The first and most important 
group, for the British, was the people from the countryside, with the Sheikh as the leader. The 
second group was the town effendis, most of them bureaucrats from the former Ottoman 
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Empire. “The focus of British hopes, and the key to rural organization, were the tribal 
shaikhs. It was they who would guard against the despotic tendencies of the effendi class.”54  
By the end of the 19th century in Mesopotamia, there were two groups attempting to gain 
more political and economic power due to the benefits of the land reforms. They were the 
sheikhs and the effendis or bureaucrats of the city. What the British did, as a way of gaining 
influence on the countryside was, that they started seeing the sheikh as the leader that they 
should count with, in the process of reorganizing the country. The rural and the urban were 
two sides into which British divided Mesopotamia. The civil administration would rule the 
urban, while they would use the power and influence of the sheikhs to control the rural side. 
 
The Officers in Charge of the British Civil Administration 
The first Chief political officer of Mesopotamia was Sir Percy Cox. He was the one 
organizing the first civil administration of Basra just days after British forces had conquered 
that vilayet in 1914. Sir Percy Cox worked directly as a Chief political officer of 
Mesopotamia until March 1918, when had to go back to London for a consultation about the 
future of Mesopotamia. While Percy Cox had been away in London, another official became 
the acting civil commissioner of Mesopotamia, that officer was Captain Arnold T. Wilson. He 
would be in charge of that country from 1918 until 1920 when the revolution exploded and 
took him away with it. Another important person at the top of the British administration was 
Gertrude Lowthian Bell. She was an Arabist, explorer and writer. By 1917 she was working 
as Oriental secretary to the chief political officer, Sir Percy Cox in Baghdad, due to her works 
on archeology, literature and exploration in the Middle East. 
The British civil and military personal that would rule Mesopotamia had come from India, 
where Great Britain had been controlling that country as a colony since the 19th century. The 
only reference they had on how to rule a foreign country was the experience they brought 
with them from India. They would use the same methods in Mesopotamia. In India British 
had ruled with a direct control of all the institutions. No important position of power was held 
by any native in India. The Indians were the people to be ruled and civilized until they were 
able govern themselves. In 1918 when Percy Cox went back to London, he was asked about 
the way Great Britain could administrate Mesopotamia, and among his replies: “He 
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acknowledged that annexation was no longer possible, but wanted supervision of the Arab 
façade to be exercised by a nominated local council. He felt it was particularly vital to exclude 
any Turkish participation in the regime.”55 On the other hand, Arnold T. Wilson, the Acting 
Civil Commissioner, was a man of a more colonialist mentality. He was a man convinced that 
direct rule was the best way to keep order in countries under British power.  Arnold T. Wilson 
was of the opinion that, Arabs, “If let into the government, they would ruin the whole country. 
The bottom line was that the British must rule Iraq. Any other view was simply naïve and 
irresponsible.”56  In general this was the view that the officers coming from India had about 
the way Great Britain had to rule Mesopotamia. 
 
Differences between London and the Officers in Mesopotamia 
The officials coming from India to Mesopotamia had a more colonialist view on how that 
country had to be ruled. The officers and politicians in London had a more realistic opinion 
about the way the administration of Mesopotamia had to be in practice. In order to understand 
why the London office had a different view of the way things had to be done in Mesopotamia, 
it is necessary to review what was happening at the international level. 
First, when USA came into the war on April 1917, the Americans brought with them a new 
world order to the postwar plans Great Britain and France had for the new countries under 
their power in the Middle East. US President Woodrow Wilson delivered an important speech 
with Fourteen Points to the Congress on January 8th 1918. The main argument of Wilson`s 
speech was, the right to “self-determination of the subject peoples of the Central Powers when 
the war was won.”57 By that, President Wilson was declaring the end of colonialism, and at 
least in theory, the new countries emerging after World War I would have the right to 
determine their own political system and organization.  
Secondly, in November 8th 1918, an Anglo-French proclamation was made. Among the 
things: 
The end which France and Great Britain have in view in their prosecution in the East of the war let 
loose by German ambition is the complete liberation of the people so long oppressed by the Turks 
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and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from 
the initiative and free choice of indigenous peoples.58 
The Anglo-French proclamation can be seen as a direct consequence of USA´s new doctrine 
of self-determination. After the war, USA became a very important international actor in 
terms of economy and politics. 
Thirdly, Great Britain gave very much power to the India Office over administration of 
Mesopotamia. In their reports, British officials in Mesopotamia wrote: 
The Civil Commissioner was given the right of direct correspondence with His Majesty´s 
Government; he was told to address his reports to the Secretary of State for 
India…Mesopotamian administration benefited very greatly from being placed in direct 
connection with the India Office, where its needs and difficulties were the subject of careful 
attention.”59 
The impact of these former issues, affected the way Great Britain was going was organize 
their administration on their new territories in the Middle East, especially in the case of 
Mesopotamia.   
Back in Mesopotamia, Arnold T. Wilson, the man in charge of the British Administration, did 
not agree with the new state of affairs. He was determined to impose his view on how to rule 
that country. “Britain, he (Wilson) argued, could not maintain its position in Iraq by 
conciliating extremists.”60 In London, British were discussing whether Mesopotamia would 
become a colony or if it should had a semi-independent status, according to the new 
international order. However, Arnold T. Wilson, Acting Civil Commissioner of Mesopotamia, 
did not pay attention to the nationalist movements that were growing all around the Middle 
East.  
 
Reorganizing the Occupied Country during 1918-1920 
When World War I reached the Ottoman Empire, Mesopotamia had been ruled by a Sunni 
minority over the vast Shi`i population. The Ottomans were never able to completely subdue 
the Arabs from Mesopotamia. The growing differences between the city bureaucrats, mostly 
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Sunni Muslims, and the people from the countryside, with many powerful Sheikhs as their 
leaders, a majority being Shi`i, would play an important role during and after the war in 
Mesopotamia and in their relationship with the British. “The Shaikh and his tribe were 
therefore “naturally” the dominant institution through which British policy aims were to be 
realized.”61 
“In November 1914 the Ottoman sultan announced jihad, invoking his title as caliph of all 
Muslims. The Ottoman sultan´s call for jihad, included a call to liberate oppressed Muslims 
around the globe and defend the empire”62 The fatwa containing the jihad was read in every 
Sunni mosque in Mesopotamia. In the beginning, Shi`i Muslims did not recognized the Sultan 
as their religious leader, because he was a Sunni caliph. “According to the precepts of the 
Shi`i, the true successor of Muhammad had to be a descendant of the Prophet´s closest male 
relative, his cousin and son-in-law `Ali ibn Abu Talib.”63 Nevertheless most of the Muslims 
followed the jihad call, seen it as a call for the defense of the Muslim brotherhood, especially 
going to the south to Basra where the British forces first arrived in 1914.64  
Between 1914 and 1918, British forces were able to take advantage of the week a Ottoman 
Empire, took control of Mesopotamia and established a civil administration. While British 
were fighting the Ottomans, on the other hand, the Ottomans were fighting the British and 
many Muslim factions inside the empire. In the case of Mesopotamia, the main social, 
religious and political group was the tribe. The tribe responded not to the Ottoman sultan, but 
to the sheikh as their leader. British officers in charge of the civil administration had a good 
understanding about that situation when they wrote: 
Over these populations the shaikhs have such authority as their hereditary position or their 
personal prowess can command, but the Ottoman officials could exercise little or no control on 
tribesmen who vanished at will into marsh or desert, whither it was impossible to follow them. 
Instead of utilizing the power of the shaikhs, the Turks pursued their classical policy of 
attempting to improve their own position by the destruction of such native elements of order as 
were in existence.65 
                                                 
61
 Toby Dodge: Inventing Iraq 2003: 83 
62
 CDR. Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN: Iraq in Turmoil, Historial Perspectives of Dr. Ali-Wardi, From The 
Ottoman Empire to King Feisal. Naval Institute Press 2012:54 
63
 Ian Rutledge: Enemy on the Euphrates 2014: 32 
64
 Ian Rutledge: Enemy on the Euphrates 2014: 32 
65
 Review of The Civil Administration Of Mesopotamia 1920: 21 
37 
 
The knowledge of the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the sheikhs of 
Mesopotamia was a very important tool British used during and after the war in order to 
defeat the Turks and reorganize Mesopotamia. The Sheikh became the most important figure 
British understood they had to relate to, in order to gain more influence in the empire they 
were fighting against and in Mesopotamia. Besides the British focus on increasing the status 
of the sheikh, another aspect British knew how to manipulate was the religious division 
between Sunni and Shi´i Muslims.  
In order to understand the religious conflict between the different branches of Islam in today´s 
Iraq during the British administration, it is necessary to take in consideration the importance 
of Mesopotamia in the development of Shi´i Islam. “Mesopotamia had declared itself for the 
hereditary right of the direct descendant of the prophet, as against an elected Khalif, before 
two divisions of Islam had taken form and name.”66   The country had the four places 
venerated by most of the Shi´i Muslims. These sacred towns are: Najaf, Karbala, Kadhimain 
and Samarra. Each one of these places is closely connected to important people in the Shi´i 
branch of Islam. In Najaf is the tomb of ´Ali. Karbalah was the place where Husayn, ´Ali´s 
youngest son, fought, died and was buried. In Karbalah the 7th and 9th Imams descending from 
´Ali are buried. And Samarra was where the 10th and 11th Imams were buried. Mesopotamia, 
with such an importance for the Shi´i Muslims had been ruled for centuries by a Sunni 
minority, and the war would heat up these differences later.  
At the time of the British occupation of Mesopotamia, there were problems among the great 
sheikhs and the tribesmen and sheikhs of smaller sections and tribes. The main problem was 
the tax payment. During the last decades, important sheikhs were in charge of collecting the 
taxes from the tribes on behalf of the Ottoman Empire. But during the war, the less powerful 
sheikhs and tribesmen stopped paying the taxes to the sheikhs in charge of it. Then a 
fellowship started developing between some of the powerful sheikhs and the British. Once the 
war was over and the British were organizing the administration, “many of the greater sheikhs 
turned to them for assistance in pacifying their unruly vassals.”67 What happened was that, 
British started supporting the sheikhs in order to facilitate the collection of taxes on behalf of 
the new administration. This created an asymmetrical relationship between those important 
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sheikhs and British officials, where the sheikhs were under their command and following 
British orders. 
 
 
The Land and the Law 
The Revenue Department was the part of the British administration, in charge of organizing 
the tax collection of the country. The first Revenue commissioner was Mr. Henry Dobbs, who 
came from India at the beginning of the British occupation in Basra in 1915. But they were 
facing a difficult problem, and it was that the Ottomans, during the war, took most of the 
important document with them when leaving the country. The tax system applied during the 
time of the Ottoman Empire was not a clear and detailed as it was written on the law. At the 
time of the British arrival, still in many places the land was owned and cultivated without any 
official proprietor. Beside these problems, British forces had the need for pushing the 
agriculture in order to rehabilitate the economy, collect taxes and try to make the occupation 
less expensive for the government in Great Britain. The new administration was firm on the 
way the pursued their goals on the new land under their occupation, as it was written on 
British documents of the time: “Landowners in general were warned that if they did not 
cultivate their states Government would take over the management of them, and no guarantee 
would be given as to the at which or the terms on which the land would be restored.”68 That 
was the voice of the British occupants of the new country at the beginning of their 
administration.  According to British reports, they had found an inefficient and corrupt 
administration that had to be reviewed and changed. 
 
Imported Law 
Among other challenges encountered by the British officials organizing their administration 
of Mesopotamia was the judicial system. As they explained: “British officials were frequently 
expected to apply a law which in Iraq, at the rate, had been a dead letter.”69 What British did 
in order to solve this judicial system totally different to what they were used to in Great 
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Britain and India?  The British Civil Administration simply applied in Mesopotamia a judicial 
system imported from India. In 1915, “the Army Commander promulgated a code, known as 
the ´Iraq Occupied Territories Code, which was based on the Indian Civil and Criminal 
Codes.”70 According to British reports, the Indian Codes were superior and simpler than the 
Turkish already applied. 
As British forces were advancing after controlling Basra in the south, by instructions from 
London, the Iraq Code, based on Indian law applied in Basra at the beginning of the 
occupation, was not going to be used in Baghdad.  From 1917 on, “[t]he Baghdad Small 
Causes Court was established in order to administer the existing civil law of the land, while 
the Mohammedan Law Court was going to work on criminal law was based on the Shar´ah 
law of Islam.”71 The same country was having two different law systems, one for the south 
and another for Baghdad and further north until 1919, when the whole country was ruled by 
the code approved for Baghdad. The explanation given by British officials concerning all 
those changes in the judicial system was the lack of records, competent judges and no 
operating court at the time of British arrival to Baghdad.  
The British administration concerning the modification of the law system in Mesopotamia, 
wrote: 
The Baghdad Penal Code is based on the Ottoman Penal Code, which at the date of occupation 
was in force in Baghdad as elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Penal Code is 
itself based on the French Penal Code, but contains important divergences from that Code. It 
was published in the year 1859, and has frequently been amended. Such amendments have 
usually been clumsy. The result is it now stands is unscientific, ill arranged and incomplete. It 
was necessary, therefore, to make very considerable amendments and additions to the Ottoman 
Penal Code. These have mostly been taken from the Egyptian Penal Code, which is also based 
on the French Penal Code, or from other Egyptian sources. –Further down British officials 
described- The Baghdad Criminal Procedure Regulation are based on the Sudan Criminal 
Procedure Code.72 
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All these changes and adaptations to the judicial system, explain how much British officials 
were improvising in the country they had under occupation. All the courts of first instance 
from Basra to Mosul had an Arab judge, but were directed by a British president.73  
 
 
The International Context 
While British officials and members of the administration were implementing changes in the 
occupied country, British politicians from London and Egypt were making international deals 
concerning the future of the Middle East with other Arab Sheikhs. 
The war of Great Britain and the allies against the Ottoman Empire was fought, both on the 
battlefield and among politicians and Arab leaders interested in gaining political and 
economical power by the defeat of the Turks. The well known contact between Sir Henry 
McMahon and the Sharif Husayn of Mecca through a series of correspondences in 1915 had 
its consequences in Mesopotamia years later. The main point of the approach between Sir 
Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca was, the British promise of an Arab independent 
state including the Arabian peninsula, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia for the Sharif and his 
four sons if they launched a revolt in the Hejaz against the Turks. The first part of the 
agreement was fulfilled by the Arabs. On June 1916 the Amir Faysal and Ali sons of Sharif 
Husayn launched a revolt against the Ottomans, “having previously been promised a subsidy 
of £50,000 per month in gold sovereigns, 5,000 rifles and a quarter of a million rounds of 
ammunition by decision of the British cabinet.”74 
While the Arabs were fighting alongside French and British, another agreement was made 
between France and Great Britain in May 1916, the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The French 
counselor in London M. Charles Francois Georges-Picot and the British Sir Mark Sykes came 
to terms on behalf of France and Great Britain. “The essence of the agreement was the 
Ottoman Middle East excepting the Arabian peninsula and Palestine (which was to be 
internationalized) was to be split in two.”75 The Sykes-Picot Agreement would change the 
terms Great Britain previously had with the Sharif of Mecca. In the letters of McMahon and 
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Sharif of Mecca, the promise involved territories that would become under Sharif´s future 
Arab state, but under the new Sykes-Picot agreement, some of those territories would become 
under French control, like the case of Syria. The second agreement had direct consequences 
for the British administration in Mesopotamia, among other reasons because many of the 
Arabs fighting with Faysal were Arabs from Mesopotamia.76  
The Arab revolution leaded by Amir Faysal, increased Arab nationalism in the Middle East. 
Because of the promise made by Great Britain to Sharif of Mecca, some Arabs on the side of 
Sharif fought with the intention of becoming independent. Inside Faysal´s army was the seed 
of a later revolution in Mesopotamia. British reports said:  
“Most of the leading men in Faisal´s army were of Mesopotamian origin, many of them being 
Baghdadis. They had always contented that they fought for the Syrian campaign for the 
liberation of their own country, and as early as the winter 1917-1918, during the hostilities 
Ma´an, they formed a society called the ´Ahd al ´Iraqi, the object of which was to secure the 
independence of Mesopotamia from all foreign control and its close union with an independent 
Syria, under the family of King Husain of the Hijaz.”77 
After the war was over, British and French divided the Middle East according to the Sykes-
Picot agreement. When the news of the British promise of Syria to France reached Faysal´s 
inner circle, he declare himself king of Syria in March 1920. His kingdom lasted just five 
months, because at the San Remo conference in April the same year, Syria became a mandate 
under France control. Faysal fought the French but was defeated and sent in exile. 
 
Mesopotamia, A Headache for Wilson and His Civil Administration  
The reaction of the people from Mesopotamia concerning the British occupation was different 
from group to group depending on their interests. For merchants, farm owners and contractors 
and many sheikhs and tribe leaders, the occupation represented a positive step for their 
economic interests. But the main opposition came from the religious leaders. During the war 
“Shi´a scholars in Najaf, Karbala and Baghdad sided with the Sunni against the non-Muslim 
invaders.” 78 
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British officials divided Mesopotamia into sixteen provinces, and each one of them 
subdivided into several districts. British imposed new taxes in order to reorganize the 
economy. There were taxes on housing, water, building taxes, animal taxes and shops. The 
new administration introduced the rupee as currency instead of the Turkish and laws from 
India. Besides that, all the provinces were directed by a British governor with almost absolute 
power. With these changes the relationship between British officials and many religious 
leaders, sheikhs and tribes started coming to a friction point. “Such absolute power, coupled 
with the predisposition of the officers to feel disdain for their “subjects”, made for a 
dangerous formula that caused many officers to meet violent death at the hands, or at the 
behest, of the scorned shaykhs.”79  
At the top of the British administration was Arnold T. Wilson, who did not want to follow the 
international changes. He did not pay attention to the nationalist movement in the Middle 
East, neither to US President Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations new anti-
colonialism agenda. Differences between British officials and people from Mesopotamia 
started in 1917, but it was after 1918 that those differences started taking a more serious tone. 
Internally among British in the Middle East there were deep differences concerning Wilson´s 
administration. One of them was Colonel T. E. Lawrence, who later became known as 
Lawrence of Arabia. Colonel T. E. Lawrence had taken part in the Arab revolt against the 
Ottomans in 1916-18. By 1920 he had become a close friend of Emir Faysal, and a critic of 
Arnol T. Wilson´s administration. In 1918 Lawrence had made public his opinion that, 
Mesopotamia had to be divided in two zones, one ruled by the Emir Abdallah, and the other 
by his brother Zayd, while Emir Faysal would rule over Syria. In that way three of the sons of 
Sharif Husayn of Mecca would rule important territories in the Middle East, something agreed 
by McMahon and the Sharif in their famous letters before the Arab revolt against the 
Ottomans. Lawrence public opinion about the future of Mesopotamia was not welcome by 
Wilson, who knew that, “Lawrence was fast acquiring influential friends in the government, 
including Winston Churchill.”80 
What did Wilson do to convince London and India who were under pressure by a growing 
unrest in Mesopotamia and to contradict Lawrence proposal?  Wilson proposed to London 
and the India office the organization of a referendum in Mesopotamia under his direction. In 
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that way Great Britain would be seen as complying with the new international state of affairs 
with the self-determination of the people under their rule.  
The referendum was organized by the end of 1918, and asked three vital questions: 
1) Whether they were in favour of a single Arab State under British tutelage extending from the 
northern boundary of the Mosul Wilayat to the Persian Gulf? 
2) If so, whether they considered that the new State should be placed under an Arab Amir? 
3) And in that case whom would they suggest?81 
The three main places where important people were consulted were Najaf, Karbala and 
Baghdad. The reports of the referendum were clear, and the answer was not what Arnold T. 
Wilson expected. The report said that, In Najaf they preferred an Emir under British 
protection, possibly a member of the Sharif family. In Karbala they wanted independence and 
an Islamic government. In Baghdad, considered the center of Mesopotamia by Wilson, and at 
the same time where British had the strongest Muslim opposition, they wanted an Arab State 
headed by a Mohammedan king, choosing one the sons of the Sharif.  Among the minority 
that voted for a British rule were Jews, Christians and some leading family members and 
merchants.82 The message was clear, the majority people conforming Mesopotamia wanted its 
independence and an Islamic state. At the same time the referendum “was an important 
milestone in modern Iraqi political history. It marked the first time Iraqi leaders were even 
asked what kind of government they desired and which ruler they favored.”83   
What did Wilson and his people do in front of the results? First of all British officials 
discredited the people who voted for an independent state, by writing that “they (the people) 
did not have a definite opinion and were not position to form one.”84 Wilson decided to 
proceed by ignoring what the consulted people had voted for. In 1919 in London, at a meeting 
with Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, Wilson presented a proposal. He 
proposed to create a British High Commissioner post, instead of an Arab Emir. Mesopotamia 
was to be divided in four provinces, each with an Arab governor chosen by the British and 
with British assistance.  Later that year, in a speech at a banquet held on Baghdad on behalf of 
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the King´s birthday on May 29th 1919, Wilson said: “Iraq needs expert guidance and foreign 
assistance if it is to escape the fate of neighbouring countries and to fulfil its destinies. It 
needs time to educate its sons in the ways of modern society.”85 In the meantime Wilson 
could maneuver at his will, because Great Britain was still in doubt about what to do with 
Mesopotamia in terms of government, due to the international change concerning self-
determination imposed by US. 
By 1919, the concept of self-determination and unconditional independence was becoming 
under interpretation of the leading powers. It would only be applied to “civilized” people, like 
those of European countries that were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. “It never seems 
to have occurred to President Wilson and his advisors that the “semi-civilised Iraq, Palestine 
and Syria should become fully independent. What the Americans wanted was order.”86 The 
new order wanted by US politicians in the Middle East, seemed to be mainly focused at 
securing their future investments in the area. 
 
The Mandate Solution 
After World War I, US became an important international power. US dollars were to be 
invested in the new growing business, namely the oil from the Middle East.  American 
politicians and investors did not want any other power on its way for investments in the 
Middle East. US policy of free and equal access to markets was to be connected with British 
and French interest without the European colonial system, but through another system.87  
“The mandatory system was first discussed at a meeting of the Allies Supreme Council on 30 
January 1919.”88 The façade of the mandate was presented as a stage on the way to a 
complete independence of any area under it. “The mandate was ratified by the principal 
powers at a conference at San Remo in April 1920.”89 
The information about a Mandate proposal began to spread in Mesopotamia. Already in 1919 
there were signs of unrest especially among Arab leaders, influenced by a growing Arab 
nationalism. British in Mesopotamia pointed out that: “The first symptom of rapproachement 
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occurred in the summer of 1919, when on two occasions Sunnis attended the religious 
meetings which were held in memory of the deceased Shi´ah mujtahid, Sayid Muhammad 
Kadhim Yazdi.”90 During the same year 1919, “important Arab leaders from Mesopotamia 
wrote to US President W. Wilson, asking him for help in order to create their Arab state in 
Iraq.”91 A second letter was sent, but there was no answer from President Wilson.92 In the 
meantime Baghdad and Karbala became centers of Islam and Arab nationalism, “creating a 
secret society called the Islamic Group.  Its goals were a rejection of British occupation, 
immediate independence, and the selection of a Muslim ruler in Iraq.”93 
While the unrest was growing, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was confirming 
Mesopotamia´s oil reserves, and this confirmation gave the Mandate idea complete form. At 
the San Remo Conference on April 24th 1920, the fate of many areas in the Middle East was 
decided by British and French and the League of Nations. It was at that conference where the 
Mandates of Mesopotamia, later officially Iraq and Syria were assigned to France and Great 
Britain.94 
When the new that Great Britain had accepted the mandate for Mesopotamia reached the 
country in May 1920, it served as a trigger for the Arab nationalism. Sunni and Shi´i religious 
differences became less important, and both sects formed a united front against British new 
mandate. The middle Euphrates became the center of a popular movement that would explode 
during the summer of 1920. Between June and November 1920, the first Arab revolution for 
independence from a European power was set in motion in the middle Euphrates. For five 
months Sunni and Shi´i Muslims came together after being left with no other alternative than 
to fight for their independence that was promised at the beginning of the war in 1914, but 
turned different at San Remo in 1920. The revolt of Mesopotamia changed the rules of the 
game for Great Britain in that area of the Middle East. 
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Chapter 3 
The Revolution and British Response 
 
During the summer of 1920, the growing differences between a considerable portion of the 
Muslim population of Mesopotamia and the British administration reached its climax. A 
mixture of issues became the ingredients and spark for the revolt. First: a strong religious 
opposition to British rule. Many important religious leaders did not want to be ruled by non-
Muslim.  Second: tribal inconformity concerning the high taxation implemented by the British 
administration. Third: demanding reactions to the promises of liberation made by the British 
to the people of Mesopotamia during the war.  Fourth: the direct effect of the conflict in Syria, 
where Faisal was declared king in 1920, and later overthrown by the French during the same 
year. Several men in Faysal´s army came from Mesopotamia and later became involved in the 
Arab struggle against the British. Fifth: the rebellion exploded at the time British military 
forces were not prepared for such violent movement, and serious tactic and military 
differences were visible between Arnold T. Wilson, chief of the administration and Lieutenant 
Gen. Aylmer Haldane, Commander in chief of British forces in Mesopotamia at the time of 
the revolt.95 What triggered the revolt? How did British forces respond? What were the 
consequences of the revolt for the British administration and for Mesopotamia? 
 
 
The Military Situation at the Beginning of the Rebellion  
According to historians, Amal Vinogradov and Ian Rutledge, the spark that ignited the revolt 
by the end of June of 1920 was the arrest of a sheikh at Rumaytha in the Diwaniya Province 
in June that year. He was sent to jail accused of failing to pay his taxes to the British.96  The 
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Province where the sheikh had been arrested was located at the mid-Euphrates, the region that 
came to be at the center of the rebellion. In his account of this event, Arnold T. Wilson wrote: 
…the inmediate excuse for this outbreak was trivial in the extreme. The Shaikh of the 
Dhawalim section of the Bani Buchaim, who had failed to repay an agricultural loan of the 
preceding year amounting to less than £ 100, was sent for by the Assistant Political Officer, 
Captain P. T. Hyatt, who pressed him for repayment. He was so truculent and insolent that 
Captain Hyatt felt he had no option but to send him by train that evening to Diwaniya. That 
afternoon, following an example which had been set at Samawa a few weeks earlier, his 
supporters broke into the sarai and forcibly released him. The neighbouring tribes to the north 
did their utmost to prevent the Dhawalim from entering their territory, but the latter had 
received definite orders from the Shamiya division (Najaf and Kufa) to rise. They were 
encouraged by assurances that, under the terms of the Mandate, Great Britain was precluded 
from using military force, and that practically the whole of our available forces had been 
withdrawn either to Persia or to India. The news fell upon fertile soil.97 
This account shows some important aspects to analyze. On the one hand, Wilson mentioned 
that the reason for the detention of the sheikh was the failure to pay taxes. Later investigations 
had revealed that, the efficient and centralized British control at that moment, reached tribal 
regions that had been isolated from the central Ottoman control, and therefore were not used 
to the press for tax payment.98 “Indeed one significant feature of the 1920 revolt was that the 
worst of the violence occurred in regions such as the middle-Euphrates where central 
demands for taxation were a new and unwelcome development to the “lawless” tribes…”99 
On the other hand, Wilson wrote about the contemporary military condition of the British 
forces in Mesopotamia. According to him, by February 1920, the military situation was 
critical.  Sir Aylmer Haldane, the man in charge of the British army in Mesopotamia, had 29, 
500 men, of whom 2,900 were Indian cavalry, 2,900 British and 23,700 Indian infantry. The 
task that absorbed most of the military personnel was the keeping custody of some 14,000 
Ottoman prisoners of war. By June, in a telegram sent by Wilson to the India Office, he spoke 
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of the weakness of the British forces in Mesopotamia at the time.100 General Haldane had a 
force of 500 British and between 2,500 to 3,000 Indian troops.101 According to Wilson, “[the] 
British troops were, almost without exception, new in the country, and without previous 
military experience.”102 This was the condition of the British military forces in charge of 
Mesopotamia at the time of the revolt in June 1920. 
 
Who were the Muslims Involved in the Revolt? 
In most of the reports written by the British Administration and Sir Arnold Wilson in 
Mesopotamia during the period 1918-1920, the term extremist was used by the British to 
describe the Arabs in Mesopotamia involved in the independence movement. During the two 
years before the revolt, there were several political movements among the Arabs in 
Mesopotamia. Between 1918 and 1919, three societies were formed by Arab leaders in 
Mesopotamia. The first was Jim`yat al-Nahda al-Islamya (The Leage of the Islamic 
Awakening), founded in Najaf in 1918. Among its members were journalists and religious 
leaders. The second society organized the same year was, Al-Jim`ya al-Wataniya al-Islamiya 
(The Moslem National League), formed near Karbala. The last of the three organizations was 
Haras al-Istiqlall (The Guardians of Independence), its foundation dates from 1919 in 
Baghdad. The last of the organizations became the most important with offices in Hilla, Kut, 
Kabala and Najaf. All of them had something in common, namely the independence of 
Mesopotamia. Most of the people participating in these groups were Shi´i and Sunni Muslims, 
civil and religious leaders. 103 The majority of people belonging to these groups seemed to be 
the same who had been opposed the British rule in the referendum organized by the British in 
1918. 
The political conflict in Mesopotamia in 1920 seemed to be reaching its highest point by 3rd 
May 1920, when the announcement of the Mandate, was made by the British administration. 
According to a British official report: 
The announcement spurred the nationalists to fresh activity. The claim to immediate and 
complete independence on the Syrian model, though it commanded the sympathy of members 
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of the upper classes who looked to taking a leading part in the Arab State, and of men out of 
job who hoped to gain a livelihood from the same source, did not make much headway in 
rousing the mass of the population. To that end an argument was needed which would be 
understood by the most ignorant and it was found in an appeal to religious fanaticism.104 
In March 1920, a Syrian Congress in Damascus had proclaimed Emir Faysal King of Syria. 
The proclamation of Faysal as King of Syria was a movement economically supported by the 
British.105 In his speech at opening of the Syrian Congress, Faisal quoted U.S. President 
Wilson´s self-determination doctrine from 1918, as the one of the main fundaments for the 
Syrian independence.106 Both in Syria and in Mesopotamia, the Arabs had appealed to the 
same argument of the self-determination expressed by U.S. President Wilson in 1918, as one 
of the fundamental reason of their struggle for their independence.  
But there were differences between the Syrians and Mesopotamians in Faysal´s army 
regarding important positions in the government. Syrians started seeing Mesopotamians as 
foreigners and this helped to ignite the nationalist movement of Mesopotamia.107 The 
claiming of an independent Mesopotamia by organized groups, supported by different social 
classes and religious leaders, was seen as an act of religious fanaticism by the British. 
Another influence from the independent movement in Syria was that, Mesopotamian men 
attached to Faysal´s army returning to Mesopotamia united themselves with the other pro-
independence groups in the country. And this was a backlash to the British because of their 
political maneuver against France and their Mandate in Syria. Arnold T. Wilson wrote: “They 
[Mesopotamians in Faysal´s army] had hitherto received from the British Treasury ample 
moral and financial assistance towards the creation in that region [Syria] of an independent 
Arab State. Why should they accept less in Iraq?”108 
During the first half of 1920, several movements started organizing resistance in different 
regions of Mesopotamia. Dier el Zor, a region near Syria, was occupied by a tribal army that 
overthrew the British Political Officer and installed a governor sent from Syria. In the city of 
Tel`Afar, North of Mosul, a British officer was killed and the tribesmen took over the fort.109 
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Under these circumstances Sir Arnold T. Wilson was taking note of the degree of power that 
such independent movements were having. He notated that: “the attacks on Tel`Afar and the 
Mosul road, gave substance to the belief that our military position was not such as would 
enable us to hold the tribes if they could be roused.”110  The situation in Dier el Zor was more 
than a simple part of the rebellion of Mesopotamia. The events in Dier el Zor, and the 
situation in Syria seemed to be related to the plans of Sharif Hussein and his sons concerning 
the creation of an Arab state as it had been promised.  In a letter from Cairo to the Foreign 
Office, date March 27/1920, British wrote about Sharif Hussein´s intention at the moment: 
Lord Allenby has received a telegram from King Hussein, who emphasizes the principle of Arab 
unity, and supports the resolutions of the Syrian and Mesopotamian Congress. He quotes H. 
MacMahon´s letter of August 30th, 1915, which confirms Lord Kitchener´s message concerning 
the independence of Arabia and the Caliphate. Hussein has begun to sign himself “Gran King of 
the Arabs”.111 
In the same document, Sharif Hussein was mentioning the support his son Abdullah had been 
receiving from the people of Syria and Mesopotamia concerning his possible appointment as 
King of Mesopotamia. The British support of Faysal in Syria was becoming more that what 
British expected, due to the expansion of the Syrian independent movement to Mesopotamia 
and the Sharif Hussein´s plans of an Arab state. The Foreign Office´s answer to the former 
document was: 
You should inform Hussein and Abdullah without delay that His Majesty´s Government do not 
regard the 29 Mesopotamians of Damascus as having any authority to speak for Mesopotamia, and 
that the future of that country can only be decided by the Peace Conference after ascertaining the 
wishes of the inhabitants.112 
Through the exchange of these documents it seemed that Great Britain and the Sharif Hussein 
of Mecca had two different agendas concerning the future of Mesopotamia. It seemed that 
Sharif Hussein´s plans of including Mesopotamia in his Arab state were not welcome by 
Great Britain. While the British support of Emir Faysal in Syria was having an unexpected 
influence among the pro-independence movements in Mesopotamia.  
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The outbreak in Dier el Zor, in March 1920, had showed the different views and opinions 
between the British administration in Mesopotamia, and the government in London 
concerning to the British economic support of Faysal in Syria and the people involved in the 
conflict of Dier el Zor in Mespotamia.  The British Commissioner Wilson was showing 
concerns about the connection between the pro-independence movement in Mesopotamia and 
Faisal´s project in Syria. A letter from the India Office in March 1920, speaks of Wilson´s 
suggestion about stopping the British economic support of Faisal, because according to him, 
part of the money had been used to sponsor the independent movement in Dier el Zor.113 
 
Arabs´ Peaceful Approach to the British 
A delegation of Arab leaders visited Wilson in order to discuss the Mandate.114 But Wilson 
refused to negotiate with the leaders. Stating that he was: “unable to accept them as 
representatives of the Iraq nation; a large body of sober-minded opinion doubted the wisdom 
of their programme [which included the rejection of the mandate], disapproved of their 
methods, and questioned their good faith.”115 Instead, in the beginning of June 1920, Wilson 
decided to invite another group of leaders chosen by him, together with the first self-
appointed committee, as the British called them. Among the members of this group were 
leading notables of Baghdad, Jews and Christians.116 
The group of leaders intended to reach an agreement with the British Administrative forces in 
Mesopotamia by appealing to international treaties, but met a hard wall in the person of the 
Wilson as the Acting Civil Commissioner. They brought out the argument of what had been 
stipulated in the Anglo-French declaration of 1918, demanding the formation of a Convention 
for Iraq, elected in conformity with Ottoman electoral law, to form a national Arab 
Government and asked for complete freedom of press.117 However, Wilson had never been a 
supporter of the Anglo-French declaration. According to Wilson: “Its promulgation was a 
disastrous error, the perpetration of which was forced upon the Allied Powers by US 
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President Wilson: it encouraged aspiration amongst Armenian and Assyrians, Chaldean and 
Syrian Christians, which neither the Allies nor United Stated did anything further.118 
After the meeting, Wilson sent a report to the India Office, where among other things he 
wrote: 
Having regards to the Anglo-French declaration I therefore see no other course open to us but 
to issue an announcement that when the Mandate is granted steps will be taken to summon a 
Constituent Assembly to consult on the future form of Government.119 
Since the referendum organized by Wilson in 1918, the British had received the same 
response from Arabs in Mesopotamia. The British were not wanted in the country by the 
majority of the population. But still on 2nd June 1920, Sir Arnold Wilson wrote to the India 
Office to consult on the future form of government in Mesopotamia, after being aware of the 
violent episodes British forces had faced with nationalists groups since the first part of 1920. 
However, until the day of the meeting with notables and Arab leaders, he had received the 
same Independence expressions from the nationalist movement in Mesopotamia. 
 
Wilson´s Differences with the Foreign Office 
During June 1920, the differences between Wilson and the Foreign Office concerning the 
Sheriffian influence in the independent movements in Mesopotamia were becoming clear. 
Wilson was constant in his belief that the Arabs responsible for the outbreak in the Mid-
Euphrates were connected to Faisal in Syria.  But the Foreign Office in London had another 
opinion. During the summer 1920, the British in Mesopotamia, with Commissioner Wilson in 
charge were worried about the events taking place in Deir-el-Zor. In a telegram from June 15th 
1920, sent by Wilson to the War Office, he stated:  
Reliable information states that a Shiah Conference held at Dair-Ef-Zor about May 25th accepted 
Amir Abdullah as ruler of Mesopotamia. Abdullah said to be coming to Dair-Ef-Zor. This 
information together with my last confirms presence of Arab force of 400 strong with one machine 
gun at Telfadgham. 
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According to this informant a force was advancing on Telafar and inhabitants were being urged to 
join the Arabs.120 
 
The response of the War Office to Wilson´s telegram, did not show confidence in Wilson´s 
information, but rather they wrote to the India Office inquiring if the events in the Mid-
Euphrates were not provoke by other group: 
I am to say that the Army Council would be glad to be informed whether, in the opinion of Mr. 
Montagu, Colonel Sir A. Wilson is correctly informed in so persistently attributing to Sherifian  
influence the anti-British activity of the Arabs on the Euphrates, or whether this hostility may not 
be inspired by the Young Arab Party of Damascus. The Council understands that the latter are 
much akin to the Young Turks of the C.U.P., in which case the fact that the Emir Faisal is unable 
to control the leaders of this movement does not necessarily imply that he sympathises  with their 
anti-British activity.121 
The exchange of correspondences between Sir Wilson and the War Office showed the degree 
of misunderstanding concerning who were the Arabs involved in the anti-British movements 
in the Euphrates in Mesopotamia since March 1920. As the War Office pointed out in the 
letter, Wilson had been persistent in his opinion that the people of the Sharif Hussein were 
connected with the movements of the Euphrates. But even though the War Office had 
received information from the Cairo Office in March that year, concerning the Sharif 
Hussein´s support of the Syrian Congress and the Mesopotamians that were interested in 
appointing his son Abdullah as ruler of Mesopotamia, they were more inclined to blame the 
Young Turks for the anti-British movements of the Euphrates.  
The discussion on who were the people involved in the anti-British movements in 
Mesopotamia, reached the British Parliament by the middle of June 1920. The Secretary of 
State of War Winston Churchill, was asked if the attacks experienced by British officers in 
Mesopotamia had been directed by isolated tribesmen or if they had been committed by 
Sherifian Arabs connected to rulers economically supported by Great Britain. To the question 
Churchill´s answer was: 
The term “Sheriffian” had been applied to the officers who led the attack on Tel Afar, but this 
expression may not be strictly accurate. Emir Faisal, the son of the Sherif of Mecca, has given 
repeated assurances that any officers of the Sheriffian army who took part in these raids would be 
                                                 
120
 Foreign Office Documents, British National Archives, FO 371/5129/E6717/95/44 
121
 Foreign Office Documents, British National Archives, FO 371/5129/E6729/25/44 
54 
 
repudiated by him. It seems more probable that the anti-British hostility of the Arabs on the 
Euphrates is inspired rather by the Young Arab party at Damascus than by the representatives of 
the Sheriffian family, who at least profess their desire to retain the friendship of His Majesty´s 
Government.122 
The anti-British activity in Mesopotamia was taking place at a moment when neither the War 
Office in Great Britain nor the British administration in Mesopotamia were sure who were the 
people involved in it. But what was becoming clear was that Wilson´s words about the issue 
were not taken as seriously by the War Office, as they took Emir Faisal´s opinion. 
On 16 June, an Inter-departmental conference was held at the Foreign Office. The top 
ministers of the India Office and the Foreign Office discussed Great Britain´s situation in the 
Middle East. One of the main issues of the conference was the situation of Mesopotamia 
under Wilson´s administration.123 The Foreign Office was critical to Wilson´s methods in 
dealing with the unrest of Mesopotamia. After reading some of the telegrams sent by Wilson 
to the India Office during June1920, the Chairman of the Foreign Office, the Earl Curzon of 
Kedleston stated that, “these telegrams left him with an unpleasant impression of Colonel 
Wilson´s incapacity to deal with the situation.” 124 Responding to that statement, the Secretary 
of State for India, Mr. E. S. Montagu said that, “he had never held the view that Colonel 
Wilson, with his marked inclination to concentrate power in his own hands, could fairly be 
asked to carry out the policy of His Majesty´s Government in Mesopotamia.”125 The India 
Office had supported Wilson in many of his policies in Mesopotamia, but the time had come 
when they had to agree with the Foreign Office about Wilson´s capacity as a British 
Commissioner in Mesopotamia.  The conference showed that the Foreign Office and Sir 
Wilson had two different concepts on how to face the situation of Mesopotamia.  For Wilson 
there were just two options, as he wrote to the India Office. They were, either to follow the 
follow his methods or to leave the country, but he did not want any negotiation with 
extremists, as he expressed.126 After the conference, Wilson´s time was counted, and Sir 
Percy Cox became the person that within months would take over his post as British 
Commissioner in Mesopotamia. The Foreign Office was trying to find a more diplomatic 
approach to the situation of Mesopotamia and Wilson was not the man for that work. 
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While the situation of the Mid-Euphrates was being discussed in the British Parliament and in 
the Foreign Office, Wilson was reporting to the War Office the seriousness of the Arab attack 
between the Mid-Euphrates and Mosul. In the report Sir Wilson was emphatic about the 
danger British officers were under the Arab offensive. He stated that, “in the absence of 
strong re-inforcements unless we take the offensive against Dairazzer our position in Mosul 
may become untenable.”127 
On 20 June, an official announcement was made by the British, and sent to the leading Arab 
delegates. The message was clear: 
His Majesty´s Government having been entrusted with the mandate for Mesopotamia, 
anticipate that the  mandate will constitute Mesopotamia an independent State under the 
guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the mandate to Great Britain; that it will lay 
on them the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and will 
require them to formulate an organic law to be framed in consultation with the people of 
Mesopotamia and with due regard to the rights, wishes and interests of all the communities of 
the country. The mandate will contain provisions to facilitate the development of Mesopotamia 
as a self-governing State until such time as it can stand by itself, when the mandate will come 
to an end.128 
The announcement confirmed the implementation of the Mandate by the British, and once 
again the people of Mesopotamia would be consulted on the matter. On 30 June, the Arab 
delegates responded to the announcement with the immediate formation of a General Council 
for Iraq.129 The same day, the arrest of the Sheikh in Rumaytha added the necessary spark for 
the spread the revolt. 
 
The Expansion of the Uprising 
Wilson´s approach in dealing with Arab leaders, the nationalist movement, and the wish of 
many tribes from the region of the middle-Euphrates to avoid the obligation of paying taxes 
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helped the fast spreading of the rebellion.130 It was in that region that the most violent 
episodes took place during the revolt.  By the beginning of July the tribes from the middle-
Euphrates had managed to derail six trains between Samawa and Diwaniya. They cut the 
railway in three places in order to isolate Samawa, Rumaitha, and communications between 
Basra and Baghdad.131 During July 1920 the insurgents seemed to be taking control of the 
revolt. In the middle and lower Euphrates there were around 100,000 rebels fighting in the 
revolt. British forces were on the retreat from most of the towns except Hilla, Kufa and the 
British base in Samawa. During the retreat 180 British soldiers were killed, 60 wounded and 
around 160 were taken prisoners, while losing vehicles animals at the hands of Arab rebels.132  
The fast advance experienced by the insurgents, showed the weak side of the British troops 
controlling Mesopotamia at that time. Before the revolt, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the 
Admiralty and Minister of war by 1920, had been pressing Wilson to reduce the amount of 
troops. “In April [1920] he had demanded that [Lieutenant Gen. Aylmer] Haldane reduce the 
garrison of Iraq by 50 per cent by the next financial year.”133 Haldane accepted Churchill´s 
petition but, suggested that it had to be done by the autumn that year. The revolt took the 
British by surprise.  Haldane, who had been in charge of the British army in Mesopotamia 
since March 1920, did not have enough information about the conditions of the country and at 
the time of the revolt was travelling in Persia.134 The defense budget the British were 
operating in the Middle East at the time, made them send many forces from Mesopotamia to 
Persia, while the rest was scattered all over Mesopotamia working on different duties. Under 
such conditions the revolt came at an inconvenient time for British forces. “The tribes were 
well entrenched and their tactics revealed a familiarity with Turkish military methods which 
pointed to their being led by ex-officers of the Turkish and Arab armies who had joined them 
from Baghdad and Dair al Zor.”135  
The situation was taken seriously by the British government, because the 15 July, Churchill 
was asked by the Parliament about the situation of the outbreak at Rumaitha and Samawa. 
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Churchill confirmed that the arrest of a local Sheikh was the immediate cause the unrest, that 
the garrison had been surrounded by the rebels, but that reinforcement were sent from Bagdad 
in order to take control of the situation .136 The British were showing concern about the 
information of the casualties in reported from Mesopotamia during the outbreak. However, 
Churchill replied that the exact number of casualties was not confirmed, but that they were 
Indian, not British at the moment. 
 
Wilson Proposing Faysal for Mesopotamia 
An event that added tension to the situation of Mesopotamia was the clash between French 
troops and King Faysal in Syria. In March 1920, Faisal had gathered a congress that declared 
him as the king of Syria, including Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan at the time. He was 
the son of the Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who had been a supporter of the British during the 
war against the Ottomans. On 14 July, Faisal received an ultimatum from the French army. It 
demanded his unconditional acceptance of the French Mandate. Even though he accepted the 
ultimatum, there was strong pressure from the population supporting him.  On 20 July, a 
French outpost was attacked by Syrian fighters and French troops launched a strong offensive 
against the Syrian army, resulting in the occupation of Damascus on 25 July. By the end of 
July the deposition of Faisal was a fact.137 When Wilson received the news of Faisal 
deposition, he sent a telegram to the India Office on 30 July, proposing Faysal as the head of 
the Mesopotamian State. Wilson stated that: 
Faisal alone of all Arabian potentates has any idea of practical difficulties of running a 
civilized government on Arab lines. He can scarcely fail to realize that foreign assistance is 
vital to the continued existence of an Arab state. He realizes danger on relying on an Arab 
army. If we were to offer him the Amirate of Mesopotamia not only might we re-establish our 
position in the eyes of the Arab world, but we also might go far to wipe out accusation which 
would otherwise be made against us of bad faith both for with Faisal and with the people of 
this country…138 
Wilson´s telegram seemed to show his concern about the local and international ramifications 
of the events that were developing in Mesopotamia and Syria. In the same telegram Wilson 
expressed his preoccupation in case Faysal would still had declared himself King of Syria, the 
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problem would just be for the French. But on the other hand, “[i]f he withdraws his claims for 
Syria and only claims paramountcy in Palestine his presence will make things hard for the 
French and will put us in a very difficult position”139 At that point Wilson was acting in a 
more pragmatic way, forced by the internal problems in Mesopotamia and Great Britain´s 
politics in the region. According to Wilson, the proposal of Faysal as a head of State in 
Mesopotamia, would avoid problems in Palestine. But and at the same time, he thought Faisal 
would be accepted by Mesopotamians, while he would support the British in return. The India 
Office, with Mr. Montagu as its minister, was positive to Wilson´s proposal. But there were 
internal differences between India Office and the Foreign Office. The latter had Amir Abdulla 
as candidate for Iraq, according to Wilson.140 These differences would take time to solve, 
while problems would continue in Mesopotamia. 
 
The Rebels Advancing and the British Worried 
July 1920 was a very intense month for British forces in Mesopotamia. During that time, the 
rebels attacked in Rumaitha where British forces were under siege for sixteen days and cost 
the lives of 148 British soldiers. During the same month the revolt expanded to Abu Skhair, 
near Najaf. There several tribes joined forces against the British. By the end of July rebels had 
capture Samawa, Ramaitha, Diwaniyya, Abu Skhair, Kufa, Najaf and Karbala. All those 
places were South of Baghdad in the Mid-Euphrates. The next step was to capture Hilla, and 
close in on Baghdad.141  Among the Arab leaders leading the uprising in the mid-Euphrates 
was, Sayyid Mushin Abu Tabikh, the eldest son of the Naqib of Basra. A well respected man. 
He was a veteran from the jihad against the British invasion back in 1914. During the latter 
years of the war he had been in exile in India and Egypt, returning to Mesopotamia in 
February 1920. He was among the Arab leaders at the meeting with Arnold T. Wilson on the 
2 June, discussing the Mandate.142 
While the revolt was at its peak, General Haldane and Arnold Wilson had serious differences 
concerning the military tactics to be implemented facing the rebels. Wilson was concerned 
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with the safety of his men, who were all over the country. He believed that the army had to be 
deployed in order to protect the lives of these soldiers. However, Haldane had another 
perception on how to direct the campaign. He became worried about the lack of reserves in 
case of an attack to Baghdad by the rebels. In a communication with Churchill, at the end of 
July, he had received the order to keep some reserve until more troops would arrive from 
India.143 The different perceptions on how to face the revolt, between the top chief of the 
administration and the chief of British forces in Mesopotamia was a reflection of how difficult 
the task of controlling Mesopotamia was becoming for Great Britain at the time. “To Wilson, 
the order was little more than a death sentence for some of those under his command and for 
whom he has deepest respect and affection.”144 
At the beginning of August, the fighting drew ever closer to Baghdad, due to an incident 
where a British official was killed by a Sheikh. Until August, the tribes between Baghdad and 
Ramadi had not been in combat against British forces. The British had a good relationship 
with Sheikh Ali Sulaiman, who was an authority in the region. He was a supporter of the 
British, and had helped to prevent the expansion of the revolt in the Dulaym province. The 
British officer, Colonel Gerald Evelyn Leachman was killed by Sheikh Dari, leader of the 
Zoba tribe. According to British sources, both men agreed to meet in order to discuss matters 
concerning crops and revenue. Later that night a group of Arabs reported that they had been 
robbed in the near Baghdad. Colonel Leachman ordered ten of his men to arrest the robbers. 
The story ends when the Zoba tribe was considered responsible of the robbery. After a while, 
Sheikh Dari approached to Colonel Leachman, followed by two men. One of them, Sheikh 
Dari´s son, fired and wounded Colonel Leachman, while Sheikh Dari draw his sword and 
killed the Colonel145  Another version of the incident, extracted from the historian Abbas 
Kadim holds that, “[t]he killing of Leachman was in line with tribal honor tradition. He 
abused the shaykh of the Zoba tribe and lost his life for it. Indeed his lawyer had said that 
Dari was on good terms with the British.”146  
The Zoba tribe was preparing for a British retaliation, but thanks to the mediation of the 
Sheikhs Ali Sulaiman, Fahd al-Hadhdhal and Muhsin, leaders of that region, the expansion of 
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the revolution was avoided, due to their good relationship with the British. Shaikh Dari was 
arrested and put in jail almost eight years later, and died on 1 February 1928.147 The episode 
of the sheikh Dari showed that still many important Sheikhs were on good terms with the 
British under the revolt, and even on cases like the one with Colonel Leachman and Sheikh 
Dari, they remained on the British side. 
The news about the British casualties during late July and the beginning of August had 
reached the Parliament, and Churchill had to answer several questions about the situation. The 
detailed account of the late days in Mesopotamia stated by Churchill concerning the British 
casualties was: 
On 24th July the Commander at Hillah, a post south of Bagdad, and between that place and Basra, 
sent forward to a point about 6 miles further on the road a small column of three companies of 
Manchesters, one company of pioneers, one squadron of cavalry, and a battery of field artillery in 
the hope of preventing the spread of disaffection northward. The column reached its destination. I 
understand that on the way back to Hillah it was attacked. The actual events are unknown, but the 
force returned to Hillah with the following loses: - Killed: British officers, 2; other ranks, 10; 
Indian officer, 1; other ranks, 7. Wounded: British officers, 4; other ranks, 22; Indian officers, 2; 
other ranks, 32. Wounded and missing: British, one officer; other ranks 6. Missing: British, 1 
officer; other ranks, 199; Indian: 1 officer; 81 other ranks. Thirty transport drivers were lost, and 
260 horses, mules and ponies were killed and wounded. One field gun, 7 ammunition wagons, 12 
Lewis guns, and 89 transport carts were lost. I am at present uncertain as to the fate of the 280 
British and Indian officers and men who are missing.148 
The report delivered by Churchill to the Parliament was not promising for the British side 
during that stage of the rebellion. During the same week, the 9 August, the British Parliament 
was interested in knowing the opinion of the British officials in administration of 
Mesopotamia concerning the establishment of an Arab state in that country. The Parliament 
was also interested about the date of the arrival of Sir Percy Cox as the new British 
Commissioner in Mesopotamia.149 After analyzing some of the discussions that were taking 
place at the British Parliament during July and August 1920, is it possible to understand the 
British interest in finding a solution to the crisis in Mesopotamia. They were losing troops, 
economic resources and the revolt was spreading.  
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During August, British forces had received military support from India with the arrival of 
thousands of soldiers, and had started using airplanes for bombing the rebels. “The urgency of 
the crisis was impressed on the British War Minister, Winston S. Churchill, who authorized 
immediate reinforcement from Iran. The reinforcements included two squadrons of the Royal 
Air Force that proceed to break the siege of Kufa through heavy bombardment.”150 With the 
help of the air bombing General Haladane was able to take his troops out of Kufa and placed 
them around Falluja, in order to defend Baghdad from a possible attack. Although British 
reinforcement was coming in August to Mesopotamia in order to face the Arab threat, Sir 
Wilson was worried about the situation. The 10 August he wrote a telegram to the India office 
expressing his fears that the military reinforcement had come too late. According to him, in 
the telegram, he was worried about the expansion of the situation from the Euphrates to other 
places of the country.151 Wilson´s telegram and the discussions at the British Parliament were 
showing the degree of seriousness of the revolt. 
 
The Reasons of the Rebellion According to Wilson 
In a letter sent from the India Office to the War Office the 12 August, 1920, the India Office 
was resending the letter Arnold. T. Wilson had sent to them from Bagdad in the beginning of 
August. In the letter Wilson was explaining, according to him, the causes of the rebellion on 
the Euphrates.  Wilson mentioned the influence of the propaganda coming from Syria and 
Turkey in the rising of the rebels. But Wilson wrote about something worth to mention, and 
that was the weakness of the British troops in Mesopotamia at the moment of the revolt. He 
stated: 
So long as our military weakness was not apparent, this propaganda, the objects of which were 
largely foreign to ideas of people at large, had little success, except in Bagdad, Kerbela and Najaf, 
where sentimental leaders have always been more or less in sympathy with the idea of pure 
Islamic state.152 
In the same document he blamed the British enemies in Syria for influencing the people on 
the Euphrates, about the possibilities of defeating the British. He wrote that, people had lost 
the confidence in the British officers to maintain order in the country. “Extremist began to 
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hope that they may be successful in attaining their object, viz., complete independence and 
freedom from all foreign interference by direct action.”153 As it has been discussed before, 
many of the Arab leaders that were hoping to achieve a complete independence had been 
trying several peaceful approaches with Wilson. But time after time he had showed no signs 
of negotiation with the people he called extremists. By the time he wrote this document, Great 
Britain was trying to find a more diplomatic solution to the crisis, but Wilson was not the man 
to implement that policy in Mesopotamia. 
The success of the Bolshevik revolution in other parts of the world had influenced the rebels, 
according to Wilson. But the United States were in another factor of bad influence in the 
revolt, in Wilson´s letter: 
United States Consul and other United States citizens, who I have every reason to know, make it 
their business to convoy to extremists in detail all references in English Press unfavorable to Local 
and Imperial policy of His Majesty´s Government, notably articles from the Times which are 
freely referred to by extremists in their public speeches and conversations.154  
Wilson´s reference concerning the English Press is treated further in this thesis. It was mainly 
how the some of the English newspapers were publishing the events of the rebellion and how 
it was captivating the English and the Arab public opinion, at the same time. The rebels had 
used U.S. President Wilson´s self-determination doctrine as an argument for the struggle, as it 
was mentioned before. Moreover, there were American interests in the oil from the region, 
and that seemed to explain Wilson´s concerns about the United States influence in the 
country. At the end of his letter Wilson stated clearly, once more, the demands of the people 
involved in the revolt: 
The demands of the rebellious leaders so far (? formulated) are complete expulsion of British from 
Mesopotamia, and an “Islamic Kingdom.” To Shamiyah this means the theocratic state which is 
their ideal; to tribes it means no Government at all, or Government by chiefs whom they can 
ignore at will.155 
The fact that has been exposed throughout this thesis about the demands of the rebels, 
concerning their wish for an independent Mesopotamia, was confirmed by Wilson in this 
document. The tribes of the Euphrates were not used to be under control, even under the 
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Ottomans. Wilson was confirming that these tribes did not like to pay taxes and that was 
another reason for them to rise against the British. But none of that would have happened if it 
was not for the British military weakness and the external causes that he had explained.156 For 
Wilson, the main causes of the rebellion were due to external factors influencing the local 
Arab leaders. But for the British government, Wilson´s methods were not corresponding with 
Great Britain´s policy in Mesopotamia by that time. 
 
The Rebels and Their Organization 
“To the vast majority of British politicians, military and officers of the Civil Administration 
the rebellion was a mere lawlessness.”157 The British were convinced that they were fighting 
in order to civilize the Middle East. Any sign of Arab organization during the revolt, would be 
blamed on an outside influence either from Europe or other international powers.158 In places 
where the British forces withdrew, like in Najaf, the rebels had managed to put together a 
state apparatus in order to substitute the British. The task was not an easy one due to 
communication and economic problems. In Karbela, leaders like the Gran Mujtahid Taqi al 
Shirazi had tried to negotiate with the British, but Wilson refused to meet Shirazi´s 
delegation.159 Shirazi´s approach to Wilson, calling to a cease-fire in July, seemed to have the 
opposite effect on Wilson. Wilson´s reaction neglecting to meet Shirazis´ delegation, might 
point in the direction that British officers in the country saw this approach by Shirazi as a 
signal that British military tactics were giving positive results.160 
In Najaf and Karbela, different committees were formed by civil and religious leaders in order 
to reestablish control after the British withdrawal. In Karbela they formed the Higher Military 
Council, directed by four senior members of the clergy. A second committee was called the 
Community Council. The last one consisted of seventeen tribal Sheikhs. In Najaf the Higher 
Religious Committee, directed by fifteen members and the City Council composed of eight 
members, was formed. The respected Gran Mutjahid Taqi al-Shirazi of Karbela died on 13 
August, and after his dead, the leading Sheikhs of the liberated areas of mid-Euphrates 
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decided to organize a provisional national government headed by a mutasarrif (governor). 
The person chosen for this new post was the landowner and veteran Muhsin Abu Tabikh.161 
An important aspect of these organizations was that, through those new committees the Shi´i 
clergy was acceding to power and most of the members of the committees were coming from 
the traditional elite of Mesopotamia. The rebels were showing signals of organization in the 
regions where British troops had been evacuated, and together with the forced retreat of 
several British troops, it was a reason for the British government to worry about 
Mesopotamia. 
 
The Revolt in the British Newspapers 
Meanwhile, British newspapers had started publishing articles analyzing the situation of Great 
Britain in Mesopotamia and the benefits and disadvantages of British direct rule in that 
country.162 Already in June, “[t]he Times explained that Wilson had attempted to Indianize 
Mesopotamia, when the rebellion was still brewing.”163 In August, T. E. Lawrence wrote 
some articles in the newspapers in Great Britain attacking Wilson´s Administration. He was 
considered by many influential British, as an authority in matters of the Middle East. In the 
article published in the Daily Herald on 9 August 1920, he wrote, “They [Arabs in 
Mesopotamia and Syria] seek to be governed after their own fashion. We in Mesopotamia and 
the French in Syria are trying to impose an alien government upon them, and the attempt is 
bound to fail.”164 According to T. E. Lawrence, it was Nationalism that kept Sunnis and 
Shiites together, and the European way of ruling the area was causing such a response from 
the Arabs nationalists. At the same time, he was of the opinion that the Bolshevik revolution 
in Russia was exportable to the East.165 
T. E. Lawrence continued his public attack on the British Administration in a report published 
in the Sunday Times, 22 August 1920. He wrote: 
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The people of England had been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to 
escape with dignity and honour. They have been tricked into it by steady withholding of 
information. The Bagdad communiqués are belated, insincere, incomplete. Things have been 
worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public 
knows. 
The sins of commission are those of the British civil authorities in Mesopotamia (especially of 
three “colonels”) who were given free hand by London. They are controlled from no 
Department of State, but from the empty space which divides the Foreign Office from India 
Office.166 
These words had a great impact on public opinion, and Wilson´s prestige as the head of the 
British Administration started to be seen in a different light. Wilson responded to Lawrence 
by saying that, “Mesopotamia as a single unit had never been included in the Arab State 
McMahon had promised to Sharif Husayn”167 In that sense, Wilson was “quoting from 
McMahon´s second note to the Sharif (24 October 1915), referring to the special status of the 
vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, as an outcome of Britain´s interests in the Gulf area.”168 
However, Lawrence´s arguments seemed to be gaining the support of the public press, while 
Wilson´s words were not convincing the same public. For Wilson, at the moment, the reason 
for the revolt was due to outside forces like the Sheriffian anti-British propaganda, but none 
of his arguments gained support among higher British circles. In August, Wilson wrote a 
telegram to H. M.´s Government in London. He stated that, “President Wilson´s 14 points 
created more agitation in the region, stimulated by Sharifian, Turkish and Bolshevistic 
agencies.” According to Wilson, “Difference of race and religion between British and Arabs, 
was used more as an excuse in itself.”169 Later political decisions taken from London showed 
that, Wilson´s days as Acting Civil Commissioner were counted. 
 
October, Beginning of the End 
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At the end of August, Churchill informed Haldane that he would send 19 battalions from 
India, together with two more air squadrons170 While British forces were receiving 
reinforcement from India and Iran, Mesopotamian rebels were running out of ammunition. 
From September on, British forces gained more control of certain areas outside the Middle 
Euphrates, especially in the northeast of Baghdad, such as in Shahraban on 9 September and 
Daltawa on 25 September.171  At the beginning of October British forces took control of the 
south of Hilla and by mid-October they captured Kifl. On the 17 September, British Kufa fell 
on British hands, and Kerbala surrender the same day as Kufa. The British offensive 
continued until 18 October when, “representatives of Najaf´s revolutionary government 
arrived at the headquarters of the 55th Brigade column to offer its surrender. They were 
informed that the first condition would be, the handing over the British and Indian prisoners 
they had there.” 172 The support offered by the use of aircraft and the tactic of cutting water 
supplies in many regions was a tactic that gave good results for the British forces by the end 
of October. 
Another major shift was experienced by the British Administration when, Arnold T. Wilson 
was asked to leave Mesopotamia. “Wilson´s departure allowed an intermediary approach – a 
compromise between Wilson´s theory of tight control and Lawrence´s vision of total 
independence – to emerge.”173  On 4 October, Wilson handed over the keys of the Civil 
Commissioner Office to Sir Percy Cox after two and a half years acting as his substitute in 
Mesopotamia. The arrival of Percy Cox to Mesopotamia marked a more diplomatic policy to 
be implemented by Great Britain after months fighting the rebels. 
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Chapter 4 
Great Britain´s New Approach  
 
After Sir Percy Cox took the position at the head of British Administration again, he came 
with the order to form a Council of Arab Ministers assisted by British advisers. The British 
plan of a Council of State with Arab Ministers, under Percy Cox´s direction, had been 
designed since June 1920.174 Cox decided that, “full tribal disarmament would have to wait 
until an Arab government was in power.”175 But the tribes that had been involved in the revolt 
would have to hand over their rifles and ammunition, and from late October several British 
columns were in charge of collecting those weapons. One of the first names on the list of men 
expected to surrender to British forces was Sayyid Abu Tabikh, the man who had been in 
charge of the government established by the rebels in Karbala. In Kufa, Najaf, Karbala, Kilf 
and Twairij thousands of rifles and large amount of ammunition were delivered to British 
soldiers.176 
Still in November 1920 some tribes, in Shamiyya and Abu Skhair were fighting. But by the 
end of the month hostilities came to an end, after the British made an announcement on 26 
November declaring the end of hostilities in that area. The British were forced to negotiate 
with other tribes, like the Hachcham tribes who were still fighting around the second half of 
November. After the falling of the most important cities, many nationalist in Baghdad and 
rebel Sheikhs decided to leave the country, and the safest place seemed to be the court of 
King Hussein in Hejaz. It was there that Abu Tabikh decided to escape with his family.177 
Officially the rebellion was suffocated by November 1920, even though guerrilla warfare 
continued until February in some places. After the surrender of the main tribes, the “British 
agreed to include, as the first term, the agreement of “an independent Arab government” in 
Iraq, which had already been decided by London, albeit not as independent as the Iraqis 
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would have expected.”178 It was during November 1920, that in a telegram, Great Britain 
suggested the use of the name of Irak, instead of Mesopotamia. “This State will undoubtedly 
be known in the future as Irak, and not Mesopotamia.”179 
The Iraqi Revolt had cost 40 million British pounds, it was twice the annual budget destined 
for Iraq and three times the total amount of the subsidies paid by Great Britain to the Arab 
Revolt.180 During the revolt, around 8,450 Iraqis were killed, a majority of them from Shi´i 
tribes in the mid-Euphrates, 312 British soldiers lost their lives, around 451 were reported 
missing and the wounded reached the number of 1,228.181 
 
The Creation of a Council of State 
The official announcement of a provisional Council State in was made on 11 November 1920. 
This institution would function as a provisional Arab government established by the British. 
At the head of the new Council was a conservative Sunni notable Abd al-Rahman al Gaylani, 
the Naqib. He had been a loyal man to the British since 1917. Besides the Naqib, the council 
consisted of Jafar al-Askari, as Defense Minister; Sheikh Taleb, as  Interior Minister; Sasoon 
Hasqiel, as Finance Minister; Mustafa Aloussi, as Minister of Religious Affairs; and Hassan 
Babji, Justice Minister. These provisional ministries were functioning between October 1920 
and January 1921.182 After the revolt, Sunni and Shi´I differences became visible again during 
the conformation of the Council. For Sir Percy Cox, the integration of Shiites into the Council 
became a challenge. “Anti-Shiite sentiment among Sunnis, as well as Shiite clergy dissuading 
Shiites from participating in the government in any form by decreeing that anyone who joined 
this government would be collaborating with nonbelievers.”183 After negotiations with both 
religious groups, Cox appointed the Shi´I -Bahr-al-Uloom Tabatai as the Minister of 
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Education and Health, and in representation of the Kurds, Ezzat Kirkukli was appointed as 
Minister of Labor and Transport. 
The creation of institutions in Mesopotamia brought thousands of people into the growing 
bureaucracy, where people who had fled the country during the revolt began to take part of. 
Problems between Shiites and the British facilitated the access of overwhelming majority of 
Sunni in the army. The very beginning of the new Iraq, after the rebellion, seemed to bear the 
seed of later Sunni-Shi´i conflicts that would develop years later. 
 
Faysal I, King of Iraq in 1921 
The Council of State was a first stage into the creation of a more organized Mesopotamia, and 
a British way of finding a more economical alternative in dealing with the country, after the 
gigantic amount of money used during the revolt. Two aspects seemed to call the attention of 
British concerning post- revolution Mesopotamia. On the one hand, it seemed that the 
creation of the Council did not appease the nationalist sentiment against British control of the 
country. Since the times of Wilson as Commissioner, the name of Faysal as the head of an 
Iraqi state had been circulating among the British in Mesopotamian India and London. By the 
beginning of 1921, the deposed King of Syria, Emir Faysal became more openly the candidate 
for an Iraqi monarchy. But the idea of making Faisal the Emir of Mesopotamia had become 
closer to reality since August 1920, after France had overthrown his short monarchy in Syria. 
When France received the information about Great Britain´s plan of creating a monarchy for 
Faisal in Mesopotamia, in August 1920, there was a negative reaction. France was totally 
opposed to the appointment of Faysal as Emir in Mesopotamia. The main argument that 
France exposed against Faisal was, that he had opposed the French in Syria by intrigue and by 
force, as they wrote to Great Britain.184 “Emir Faisal was now being widely touted as the most 
suitable candidate – a “consolation prize” on the part of the British for their acquiescence in 
the French overthrow of his Syrian kingdom.”185 
There seemed to be some reasons for Great Britain electing Emir Faisal as head of state in 
Mesopotamia after the rebellion. On the one hand, the main reason of the revolt had been the 
wish of an independent Mesopotamia with an Arab leader representing the country, and Faisal 
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was coming from a well-known Arab family. On the other hand, since 1915, Great Britain had 
an agreement with Faysal´s father, the Sharif Hussein, concerning the creation of an Arab 
state under his direction, for his support during the war against the Ottomans. After the revolt 
of Mesopotamia, Great Britain was able fulfill part of the agreement with Hussein of Mecca 
and satisfy the wish of many Arab leaders in Mesopotamia by having an Arab head of state. 
On the other hand, the military aspect of British in Mesopotamia would experiment a change. 
Winston Churchill together with other generals were convinced that, “controlling Iraq should 
be turned over to the RAF (Royal Air Force), - a far more economic way of ensuring the 
survival of Britain´s new “friendly native state” than the traditional method of large infantry 
garrisons.”186 
In February 1921Winston Churchill became British colonial secretary, with a Middle East 
portfolio to work on. Among his advisers on the region was E. T. Lawrence. In March the 
Cairo Conference, where Emir Faisal was confirmed as the future monarchy of Iraq, was 
arranged. A referendum concerning Faysal candidature as King of Iraq was held in Iraq, 
where he received support from 96 per cent of the electorate, in the major cities like Mosul, 
Bagdad, Basra, Karbala, among others, and by August 1921, Faysal had become King of 
Iraq.187  
The Hashemite monarchy installed by the British in Iraq in 1921 was not well accepted by 
many among the population. There were still divisions between the pro-Turkish and pro-Arab 
government in the country. In the north of the country there were groups demanding the 
return of Mosul vilayet to Turkey. Many of the Arabs that had supported Faisal in Iraq had 
conditioned their support expecting to gain a Shi` majority in the parliament and on important 
positions of political influence.188 The direction of the new monarchy seemed to be a 
challenging task for Faisal and the Great Britain after 1921. 
On October 1921, Iraq and Great Britain signed a treaty for twenty years. The treaty consisted 
on British right to have troops in Iraq, control of the country´s foreign policy and to have 
British advisers in the Iraqi new government among other things. British Air Force replaced 
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the ground troops. A constitution was proclaimed and the Euphrates region was neglected and 
became a region controlled by landlords189 The Iraqi revolt of 1920 made Great Britain 
change the direct rule policy that they intended to apply since the creation of the British 
administration of the country in 1918. The British helped to create the Iraqi state after the 
rebellion and brought an Arab Emir as the head of state in 1921. But it would take decades 
before the British gave the control of the country to the Iraqi people.  
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Conclusion 
The discovery of oil in Iran at the beginning of the 20th century, opened a new era concerning 
technology and warfare in the world. Great Britain, France, Germany, Netherland were 
among the countries interested in the new source of energy discovered on that region of the 
Middle-East. The creation of international companies with interests in extracting the Persian 
oil produced a competition among the different countries involved. With the outbreak of 
World War I, the protection of the oilfields in Iran became part of the war strategy for Great 
Britain, being the country with most of the rights for oil exploitation of that region. It was in 
this war context that Great Britain decided to occupy the South part of Mesopotamia, in order 
to protect the Persian oilfields close to that region. During the war period, Great Britain made 
promises to important Arab leaders in order to bring them on their side against the Ottomans. 
At the same time, the British deals with France on how to distribute the Middle-East between 
them, and the plans of a home for the Jewish in Palestine, made the post-war situation 
difficult for the British. 
The promises made by Great Britain to Arab leaders like Sharif Hussein from Mecca at the 
beginning of the war, played a very central role during and after the war. While receiving 
economic support from the British, Sharif Hussein and his sons organized the Arab revolution 
against the Ottomans from 1916, until 1918. But those promises became difficult to put into 
practice once the war was over, due to the agreements Great Britain had with France and in 
Palestine.  
The British occupation Basra, in the South of Mesopotamia during World War I, triggered a 
chain of events far from expected. It is from today´s historical perspective that is possible to 
say, that what followed the occupation of Basra in 1914 until the summer of 1920, was not 
totally planed by the British. What initially was a local occupation in Basra, extended later to 
North of the country, and by 1918 there was a civil administration for the whole 
Mesopotamia. The extension of the British occupation to the North was not a planed strategy, 
but a result of the war context, as we have explained before. The British expansion from 
South to North in Mesopotamia was not an easy campaign. The Arab resistance was stronger 
than what the British had experienced in Basra at the beginning of their invasion. By the time 
Baghdad came under British control in 1917, Great Britain had lost many soldiers during that 
campaign. The Arab resistance proved to be more organized than the British soldiers had 
73 
 
realized. But more resources and technology, the British forces were able to take control of 
Bagdad and started the organization of the British Civil Administration for the whole 
Mesopotamia.  
As we have seen, the population of Mesopotamia was majority of Arabs, but there were 
minorities like, Christians and Jews. Between the Arabs, there was a majority of Shi`i 
Muslims, but while Sunnis represented a minority of the Muslim population, it was that group 
who had more access to power through the bureaucracy appointed by the Ottomans. These 
differences were more visible after the arrival of the British troops, through their interaction 
with the different Sheikhs of the country that had continued on the British side after the war.  
The British Administration had economically supported a large group of Arab leaders in 
Mesopotamia, in order to keep their tribes under control. But not all the Arabs leaders agreed 
to follow and support the British in the country. There were many who had fought against the 
British troops when they arrived to in Basra at the beginning of the war. Some of those 
leaders, as we have discussed before, were interested in an independent country, while others 
were interested in an independent Arab state with one of Sharif Hussein´ sons as its leader. 
Another important group that did not take side with the British was among the most important 
religious leaders.  But the point to focus is that there was a pro-independence movement since 
the war years, and the movement continued expanding until it reached its climax by 1920. 
The British officials in Mesopotamia decided to apply the same colonial administrative 
system that Great Britain had used in India. I fact, most of the official in charge of the 
administration in Mesopotamia had come from India, including Arnold T. Wilson, the 
Commissioner in charge of the British administration since 1918, until the revolt of 1920. The 
way British officials were directing the administration in Mesopotamia, was without a direct 
participation of the Arabs of the country. As it was the case in India. The law system applied 
in Mesopotamia was a copy of what the British had done in India. Although they kept some of 
the laws used during the time of the Ottomans in Mesopotamia, most of the new laws 
implemented by the British were a mix of the Indian, Egyptian, French and Ottoman codes, as 
we had discussed before. The result of this new law system was not welcome by many of the 
Arabs leaders and tribesmen of the country. But the Commissioner in charge of the 
administration, Arnold T. Wilson had a vision that Mesopotamia had to be ruled, until the 
Arabs could be civilized and able to do it by themselves. For him and many British officials, 
any Arab leader who did not agree with the British administration was considered an 
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extremist, as it had been pointed out in several British documents. Wilson´s concept on how 
Great Britain had to rule over Mesopotamia was clashing with the new doctrine of self-
determination and the beginning of a post-colonial era that was expressed at the international 
level. 
The international post-war context played a central role in the development of the situation in 
Mesopotamia.  The self-determination doctrine expressed by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson 
of 1918 was an argument used by some of the nationalist leaders in Mesopotamia in their 
quest for an independent country. In a period where colonialism was not welcome by many 
countries in the post-war years, Great Britain was facing a challenge in Mesopotamia, 
concerning the way of ruling the country. Officially, Mesopotamia could not become a 
colony, as India and other African countries had been under British rule. However, the 
promises of liberation made during the war to many Arab leaders in Mesopotamia, were 
becoming difficult to fulfill. It was during the years of 1918-1920 that the nationalist 
movement was becoming organized and started growing in Mesopotamia. While Great Britain 
had not, at least in practice, a clear agenda on how to rule that country without turning it 
officially into a colony. The British had agreements with France, and the Sharif Hussein from 
Mecca about the distribution of some of the Middle-East regions, and it was becoming a 
challenge to come with a peaceful solution. 
The year 1920 marked a difficult period for Great Britain in the Middle- East. Several British 
officials were killed in Mesopotamia during the first part of that year, in assaults directed by 
different nationalists groups. The declaration of Faysal as King of Syria in March 1920, by a 
Syrian Congress, had been economically supported by the British, and it brought unexpected 
results months later. The French reaction was the overthrowing Faisal from his brief 
monarchy months later. Faysal´s project in Syria made the situation tense for the British and 
France.  
The announcement of the British Mandate over Mesopotamia in May 1920 triggered the 
reaction of many nationalists in the country. However, the way the British Commissioner 
Wilson faced the situation with the Arab leaders in the country, did not bring any solution to 
the impasse between the Arab leaders and the British administration of the country. The 
period of Wilson at the head of the Civil Administration between 1918-1920, especially the 
last year, was marked by difference of opinion between London and the India Office, how to 
rule Mesopotamia. These differences seemed to be the product of the problems faced by Great 
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Britain concerning the way on how to rule the Mesopotamia. Documents and later 
investigations have showed how the Arab leaders tried to reach a peaceful agreement with the 
British Administration in the light of their aspirations for an independent country. But Wilson 
was not interested in negotiating with those leaders.  In June 1920, the nationalist movement 
reached its climax in Mesopotamia and the rebellion exploded. 
The revolt came at the moment when the number of British troops in Mesopotamia was not 
sufficient in order to suffocate a rebellion like that. That seems to be one of the causes why 
the revolt expanded faster through the Mid-Euphrates. British troops at the moment of the 
revolt were spread over the country and that seemed to help the offensive of the rebels. 
Something that had given relevance to the revolt was that, during that period many Sunni and 
Shi´i Muslims put aside their religious differences and fought together against the British. 
Between June and August the rebels seemed to have the advantage over the British in the 
conflict. By August 1920, many of Faisal´s men in Syria had joined the rebellion in 
Mesopotamia. The reason was that several of them were Iraqis, and the brief monarchy 
installed by Faysal in Syria had produced another movement of Arabs in Mesopotamia 
wanting Faysal´s brother, Abdullah as a king of the country. Since June 1920, Great Britain 
was facing a revolt in Mesopotamia, and by August their project with Faisal in Syria had been 
stopped by the French.  
After Great Britain decided to send troops from Iran and India to Mesopotamia in August, the 
balance of power turned to the British side from September 1920. The use of airplanes for 
bombing the rebels was another important advantage for the British during the rebellion. It 
was the beginning of tactical use of airplane in warfare. Besides the British superiority in 
weapons, ammunition and technology, the revolt became a disorganized movement without a 
central organization after it had spread during months. It took months before the British could 
control the revolt during the summer of 1920, before the government in London decided to 
send Sir Percy Cox to Mesopotamia, to take command of the Civil Administration that year.  
By November, the revolt had been controlled by the British, but at a heavy cost. Thousands of 
Arabs and hundreds of British died during the conflict and a military campaign that was very 
expensive for the British. The time for a new approach on how to rule that country had come 
after the revolt. 
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The creation of the Council of State, including Sunni and Shi´i Ministers, was the first change 
applied by the British in Mesopotamia after the revolt in October 1920. For years, many Arab 
leaders of the country had showed their intentions of being part of the government, but it was 
not until the revolt that the British decided to create a space for Arab Ministers. The Council 
of State was a step before the creation of a monarchy with Emir Faysal as King of Iraq in 
August 1921. As it has been analyzed before, Faisal´s short monarchy in Syria had been 
sponsored by Great Britain, but the French had overthrown him and the country became a 
French Mandate. The creation of a monarchy for Faysal in Mesopotamia seemed to be part of 
the war promise made by the British to Faysal´s father, Sharif Hussein. But at the same time, 
to install a Muslim monarch in Mesopotamia seemed to be the best outcome, in order satisfy 
most the Arabs of the country with a head of a state of their own race and religion. 
 
What kind of administration and changes did the British implemented in the country?  
The majority of the British officers in charge of the administration of Mesopotamia had come 
from India. While Great Britain had ruled over India, the direct and total control of the 
administration had been the method applied by the British in that country. India had become 
an English colony, and that was the concept Great Britain and Colonel Arnold T. Wilson, in 
charge of the British Administration, since 1918, had decided to put into practice in 
Mesopotamia. 
Since 1915, British officers established a local administration in Basra, the first region of 
Mesopotamia occupied by Great Britain, at the beginning of World War I. The public 
administration the British had found in Basra from the time of the Ottomans experienced 
important changes, with the arrival of the British troops.  The juridical system existing in 
Mesopotamia since the time of the Ottomans, was supplanted by the British with the 
application of a civil code imported from India. Between 1917 and 1919, the British were 
using a civil code imported from India and a penal code based on the Shar´a law of Islam, for 
the same country. But many of the new adaptations that the British made to the penal code of 
Mesopotamia were taken from the French and Egyptian penal code. In practice, the British 
officers in Mesopotamia seemed to be improvising while their administration was being 
established in the country. The main reason for the implementation of the different codes of 
laws seemed to be the lack of records left by the Ottomans during their retreat, as they wrote. 
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The country was divided into sixteen provinces and those provinces were subdivided again 
into districts, in order to reorganize the administration, and the taxes imposed by the British 
Administration in Mesopotamia were not welcome by many Sheikhs and tribes. Since the 
time of the Ottoman, the tribes of Mesopotamia, especially those from the Mid-Euphrates 
were not used to pay taxes. The Ottomans had not been able to completely subjugate the 
whole Mesopotamia under their rule. But the British through the new tax collection system 
applied in the country started facing differences with certain tribes and Sheikhs. 
At the arrival of the British to Mesopotamia, the Sunni Muslim, who were a minority in the 
country, were the ruling class over the Shi`i who were the majority the population. There 
were differences between the Sunni Muslims from the cities and many of the Shi`i Sheikhs 
and tribes from the countryside. What the British did was to rely on and support many of the 
Sheikhs, as a way of pacifying the country during and after the war. For the British, the 
Sheikh represented a natural institution they could rely on. The economic support of many 
Sheikhs implemented by the British would clash with important religious leaders and many 
other Arab leaders who had fought against the British occupation of the country in 1914. 
From the beginning of the British occupation of Mesopotamia, the population was divided 
among the pro-British, the pro-Turkey, and the pro-independence group.  
For British Administration of Mesopotamia, the population was in its majority, a group 
people to be civilized according to the British system. 
 
What caused the Iraqi revolution of 1920?  
The implementation of imported laws, a more efficient taxation system, and the British 
economic support of many Sheikhs was creating division among the population. The constant 
resistance of many Arab leaders against the British rule of the country was growing and 
organizing through the years.  
There seemed to be both local and international causes for the rebellion of 1920. On the local 
aspect, many British documents pointed in the direction that Arnold T. Wilson was not a man 
of negotiation with the Arabs in Mesopotamia. At the beginning of World War I, when the 
British troops arrived in Basra, they had come as liberators. Many Arab leaders had fought 
against the Ottomans based on war promises made by the British. What was supposed to be a 
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local occupation of Basra, became a complete administration of Mesopotamia after the war. 
During the first two years after the war, the pro-independence movements of Mesopotamia 
became more organized. Many Arab leaders sought the diplomatic approach with the British 
Commissioner Wilson, without any positive result between 1918 and 1920. For Wilson it was 
impossible any negotiation with the people he called extremists. His position was to rule 
Mesopotamia by force, if necessary, or the British should leave the country, as he wrote to the 
India Office several times.  
There were signals of unrests in the country among the pro-independence groups. After 1918, 
there had been sporadic clashes between British officers and Arab groups. But by the 
beginning of 1920, several British offices lost their lives in different circumstances, involving 
violent incidents between Arabs and British. The war had changed an empire for another in 
Mesopotamia. But the difference seemed to be that under the Ottoman rule, Mesopotamia was 
never under the direct control of the Ottomans as they were becoming under the British rule 
after 1918. 
On the international level, the United States had interests in the oilfields found in Iran by the 
British at the beginning of the 20th century. But after the war U.S. President Woodrow 
Wilson, had spoken about a self-determination doctrine in 1918. The point of the self-
determination was going in a post-colonial direction after the war. The countries liberated 
after the war were supposed to determine their own future, without external influence. That 
was an argument used by the Arabs who were pressing for an independent Mesopotamia 
before the revolt. Great Britain double policy with France led them into the sponsorship of 
Emir Faysal in the establishment of a monarchy in Syria in 1920. 
While Great Britain was supporting Faisal in Syria, there seemed to be that the Hashemite 
family, with the Sharif of Mecca in the leadership, was supporting the pro-independence 
groups in Mesopotamia by 1920, especially those interested in establishing Emir Abdullah, 
the other son of Sharif Hussein, at the head of an Emirate in Mesopotamia. Wilson wrote 
several letters to the India Office expressing his concerns about that situation during 1920. Sir 
Winston Churchill had to answer several interrogations at the British Parliament about the 
same situation in Mesopotamia. Wilson was constantly blaming the Sheriffian [supporters of 
the Sharif Hussein and his family], for the growing unrest of the independent movement in 
Mesopotamia. However, for Churchill, the causes of the unrest in Mesopotamia were not 
sponsored by Faisal, but from the pro-Turkish groups in Syria, as he stated in the Parliament. 
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The brief monarchy of Faysal in Syria, during 1920, served as a trigger for the independent 
movements of Mesopotamia. Many of Faysal´s men in his army had come from 
Mesopotamia, and after France had overthrown Faysal, many of them started joining the 
rebellion on the Euphrates. The years between 1918 and 1920, seemed to be a period where 
Great Britain did not have any clear plan on how to rule Mesopotamia. The post-war had 
brought a new international order with the influence of the self-determination doctrine, and 
officially Great Britain could not rule Mesopotamia based on a colonial system. The war had 
left Great Britain with a weak economy and the troops that were in Mesopotamia were not 
sufficient for keeping the control of the country in case of unrest, as Sir Wilson stated as one 
of the reasons for the fast spreading of the revolt in Mesopotamia during the summer of 1920.  
The British seemed to be divided between those in London who wanted to give more 
participation to the Arabs in the administration of Mesopotamia, and those like Wilson who 
were of the opinion that Great Britain needed to have direct control of the country. Those 
differences had reached the public opinion in Great Britain through the British newspapers by 
1920. Different articles were written denouncing the British “indianization” of Mesopotamia. 
Influential people like the British Colonel T. E. Lawrence, who was pro-Arab and close friend 
of Faysal, wrote several articles in different British newspaper, directly confronting Wilson´s 
policy in Mesopotamia. 
It was in the middle of this local and international context, that the announcement of the 
British official control of Mesopotamia through the creation of a British Mandate was given 
to the people of Mesopotamia in May 1920. The news of the Mandate was not welcome by 
many of the Arab leaders of the country. Arab Committees were organized in order to speak 
with Commissioner Wilson about the meaning and content of the Mandate of Mesopotamia 
system announced by the British. But the lack of diplomacy expressed by Wilson several 
times when dealing with some of the Arab leaders of Mesopotamia did not help to prevent the 
outbreak of June in 1920. 
 In London, the Foreign Office did not agree with Wilson´s methods in dealing with the 
situation at the moment of the outbreak on the Euphrates. The central government in Great 
Britain was by 1920, intending to seek a more diplomatic solution for the unrest of 
Mesopotamia months before the rebellion. It took months of fighting, Arab and British lives 
lost during the revolt, before the British would send Sir Percy Cox again to Mesopotamia in 
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October 1920, to take the place as British Commissioner and a more diplomatic solution and 
policy was implemented in Mesopotamia by Great Britain, after the revolt. 
 
Did the revolution bring any changes to Mesopotamia?   
The Iraqi revolution brought changes to the relationship of Great Britain with Iraq. The 
violent level that the rebellion reached between June and July 1920, placed Great Britain in a 
defensive position. The letters and documents exchanged by the different British Offices 
expressed the level of seriousness of the situation. The debates and interrogations at the 
British Parliament during the first months of the revolution, showed how worried the British 
government was about the event.  British troops had to retreat and evacuate from several 
places around the Euphrates. Important communication lines like the train were destroyed by 
the rebels during the outbreak.  
For years, many Arab leaders had expressed their interests in the participation of the 
administration of the country. But it was after the revolution that Great Britain created the 
Council of State for Mesopotamia, with both Sunni and Shi`i ministers. There was an Arab 
monarchy created and Iraqis were able to reach high positions on the state apparatus. Great 
Britain had for decades a direct influence in Iraq, through the monarchy of Faysal, but the 
rebellion had showed the British that the time for a new approach in the direction of Iraq had 
come.  For years the revolution of 1920, had been cultivated as a political inspiration for 
many Pan-Arab nationalists.  
Although after a short period,  the Sunni Muslims became again the most influential group of 
the country. In reality, the British still had control over the country until the revolution of 
1958, but in a different way, not with a direct colonial system as it was before the rebellion. 
The revolt of 1920 had reached an important place in the narrative of Iraq´s modern history. 
Although a full independence was not achieved, it opened the way for nominal independence 
of 1932, and had been used as an example by different religious and revolutionary Muslim 
groups in modern Iraq, of how Sunni and Shi´i fought together against a common enemy in 
modern times. 
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